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REVIEW OF DEATH PENALTY JUDGMENTS BY
THE SUPREME COURTS OF CALIFORNIA:
A TALE OF TWO COURTS
Gerald F. Uelmen*
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was
the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the ep-
och of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season
of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of
hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us,
we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven,
we were all going direct the other way-in short, the period
was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest au-
thorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in
the superlative degree of comparison only.
... In the midst of them, the hangman, ever busy and ever
worse than useless, was in constant requisition; now, stringing
up long rows of miscellaneous criminals; now, hanging a house-
breaker on Saturday who had been taken on Tuesday; now,
burning people in the hand at Newgate by the dozen, and now
burning pamphlets at the door of Westminster Hall; to-day,
taking the life of an atrocious murderer, and to-morrow of a
wretched pilferer who had robbed a farmer's boy of sixpence.'
I. INTRODUCTION
From 1979 through 1986, the Supreme Court of California reviewed
sixty-four judgments of death. Five of them, or 7.8%, were affirmed.
From 1987 through March of 1989, the Supreme Court of California
reviewed seventy-one judgments of death. Fifty-one of them, or 71.8%,
were affirmed. In two short years, the California affirmance rate for state
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supreme court review of death penalty judgments moved from the third
lowest in the United States to the eighth highest.' The revolution which
demarcates this dramatic shift was the retention election of November,
1986, in which the voters of California removed Chief Justice Rose Bird
and Associate Justices Joseph Grodin and Cruz Reynoso. In early 1987,
Justice Malcolm Lucas was named Chief Justice, and Associate Justices
John Arguelles, David Eagleson, and Marcus Kaufman were appointed
to the court. Rarely has a high court undergone such a dramatic change
in so short a time.
While legal observers spend oceans of ink and forests of paper trac-
ing the minute shifts which emanate from the comings and goings of
individual justices, rarely do they have such a laboratory to study judicial
behavior. Reading a death penalty opinion of the Bird court, then a
death penalty opinion of the Lucas court, one often sees the same prece-
dents cited and the same legal principles exalted. The remarkable trans-
formation of results occurred with very few opinions of the Bird court
being overtly overruled or limited by the Lucas court. But in reading the
collective whole, one is haunted by the sensation that two remarkably
different institutions are at work, and the animus driving these two insti-
tutions is as different as night and day.
This Article will compare the process of reviewing death penalty
judgments employed by the Bird court with the process employed by the
Lucas court, as revealed in the published opinions of the two courts. The
thesis that will emerge is that, at least in reviewing death penalty judg-
ments, two very different models of the appellate function are at work.
The Lucas court approaches the review of death penalty cases very
much like intermediate appellate courts approach the review of ordinary
criminal cases. The process closely matches the process described in a
classic study of criminal appeals in the California Court of Appeal for the
First Appellate District as it operated in the mid-1970s: "The court ap-
proaches its work from a perspective that is noninterventionist, nonsu-
pervisory, and conflict avoiding. Its decision process accentuates the
value of finality and is strongly inclined toward affirmance." 3 That study
noted that a high rate of affirmance of criminal appeals reflected basic
institutional norms and perspectives. Essentially, the justices ap-
proached their task with great deference to the trial judge:
As a result, the Court of Appeal seldom asks what the best or
most appropriate answer to a legal issue would be; rather, it
2. See infra Appendix, Table 1.
3. Davies, Affirmed: A Study of Criminal Appeals and Decision-Making Norms in a Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 543, 612 (1982).
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usually asks only whether the trial court's answer is within ac-
ceptable bounds. In addressing that latter question, the basic
norms of appellate review collectively call for the Court of Ap-
peal to defer to the judgment of the trial court if possible, and
direct the Court of Appeal to resolve any doubts or ambiguities
in the direction of affirmance.4
The basic norms of appellate review thus become norms of affirmance.
These include the principle of abstention in issues not presented below,
the substantial evidence rule, and the harmless error rule. The common
effect of each of these norms, as described by Dr. Davies, "is to cut off
inquiry and transform problematic issues into routine affirmances. Once
these norms are internalized by intermediate appellate judges, the norms
create a perceptual filter that makes the appeals themselves appear to be
devoid of any significant issues."5
It is not coincidental that the new justices appointed to the court in
March of 1987 arrived with the norms of intermediate appellate judges
well internalized and the concept of deference to trial judges firmly em-
bedded. Justice Kaufman was a veteran of seventeen years on the Fourth
District Court of Appeal. Justice Arguelles had served on the Second
District Court of Appeal for only three years, but served for fifteen years
as a trial judge on the Los Angeles County Supgerior Court. Justice Ea-
gleson was a justice of the Second District Court of Appeal for two years,
and had been a trial judge on the Los Angeles County Superior Court for
the previous fourteen years.
The approach of the Bird court in reviewing death penalty judg-
ments reflected a norm of reversal, in which the court paid little heed to
principles such as abstention, the substantial evidence rule, and the prin-
ciple of harmless error. Doubts, particularly those involving choice of
sentence, were resolved in favor of reversal because of the severity and
finality of the judgment being reviewed. Although the Bird court may be
viewed as an extreme example, a similar phenomenon has affected other
courts. For example, in a classic study of death penalty review by the
United States Supreme Court during the Warren era, Barrett Prettyman,
Jr. noted:
The fact is that a Justice of the supreme court will delay an
execution any time he has reasonable grounds to believe that
the condemned man has not received every safeguard the Con-
stitution demands. Life is precious and sacred, and the state
4. Id. at 592.
5. Id. at 607.
November 1989]
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undertakes no more awesome a responsibility than when it de-
liberately sets about to excise the life of one of its citizens.
Every protection must be accorded innocent and guilty alike,
regardless of delay, lest a mistake be made for which there can
be no remedy.6
Ultimately, the difference in philosophy boils down to one question:
Are death cases different? Prior to the 1986 general election, that ques-
tion was posed to all of the justices of the California Supreme Court.
Only Justices Lucas and Grodin responded:
Justice Lucas: I personally do not apply "tougher" standards
to capital cases, believing as I do that, assuming proper and
careful attention is given to reviewing these cases, the law
should be uniformly and consistently applied without regard to
the penalty selected in a particular case.
Justice Grodin: ... the very fact that the penalty is final and
irreversible makes it necessary for each judge, no matter what
his or her personal views, to be exceedingly careful. Once the
sentence is carried out, it is too late to correct mistakes.7
The significance of this difference in approach can be more clearly
delineated by separating our analysis of the three determinations that are
reviewed by the supreme court in capital cases. Whether it is appropriate
to treat death cases the same as other cases might be answered differently
in the context of guilt or special circumstance determinations than in
penalty determinations. After contrasting the Bird court and Lucas
court in each of these three spheres, I will conclude that it is most essen-
tial to preserve supreme court review of penalty phase determinations.
There is little to be lost by consigning the task of reviewing guilt and
special circumstance determinations to the intermediate courts of appeal.
A system of two-tier review should be instituted, in which guilt and spe-
cial circumstance determinations are reviewed in the intermediate courts
of appeal, and penalty determinations are reviewed by the supreme court.
The supreme court should also retain discretion to grant hearings on
guilt and special circumstance issues after court of appeal review.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The death penalty goes back to California's beginning as a state, and
a brief overview of its history will put the past twelve years in sharper
focus. We will never know how many Californians were officially exe-
6. B. PRETTYMAN, DEATH AND THE SUPREME COURT 251 (1961).
7. L.A. Times, Aug. 18, 1985, § I, at 1, col. 1.
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cuted during the first forty-one years of California statehood. Execu-
tions were performed by county authorities, and records are not
available. The state legislature remedied this situation in 1891, by requir-
ing that all executions be carried out at one of the state prisons.' After
1893, all hangings were performed by the state authorities either at Fol-
som Prison or San Quentin. A total of 306 prisoners were executed by
hanging during the forty-five year period ending in 1938, at an average
rate of seven per year. Ninety-two were hanged at Folsom, while 214
met the end of the rope at San Quentin. Nearly all had been convicted of
murder. Only three had been convicted of assault by one serving a life
sentence, which became a capital offense in 1901,' and three were hanged
for aggravated kidnapping, which was made a capital offense in 1933.10
Most of those who were hanged in California sought appellate re-
view of their convictions, but at least seventy-four went to the gallows
with no review of their convictions by an appellate court. 1 Automatic
review of death penalty cases by the California Supreme Court was not
instituted until April, 1936. Lethal gas was adopted as the means of exe-
cution for California on August 27, 1937.12 The first person to die in
California's gas chamber at San Quentin was Albert Kessell, a Sacra-
mento murderer, who was executed on December 2, 1938.1' One hun-
dred ninety-one men and four women have since died in the San Quentin
gas chamber. 4 Executions proceeded at an average rate of eight per year
during the twenty-year period ending in 1958. While appeals were auto-
matic, the delay between the pronouncement of sentence and actual exe-
cution averaged less than two years.' 5
Under the California Constitution adopted in 1879, clemency power
was curiously distributed among the executive, legislative and judicial
branches. Article VII, Section I provided that the governor could par-
don or commute the sentence of a twice-convicted felon only with the
concurrence of a majority of the supreme court. 6
8. 1891 Cal. Stat., ch. 191, § 9, at 274 (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE § 3603
(West 1988)).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4500 (repealed 1977).
10. Id. § 209 (repealed 1977).
11. Danielson, Facts and Figures Concerning Executions in California, 1938-1962, April
15, 1963 (unpublished paper prepared with the assistance of Assembly Legislative Reference
Service); see also Uelmen, A Concise History of Capital Punishment in California, 8 CAL. A.
CRIM. JuST. F., Sept.-Oct. 1981, at 19.
12. Uelmen, supra note 11, at 19.
13. Id. at 20.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. CAL. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1879) (revised and renumbered as art. IV, § 8 (1966)).
November 1989]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
A study of the criminal records of ninety-seven persons executed
between 1938 and 1953 indicated that 51.6% had been in prison one or
more times prior to the conviction for which they were executed. 17 How-
ever, there is no recorded example of the state supreme court recom-
mending clemency of a twice-convicted felon. An application by Warren
K. Billings, who was convicted of the San Francisco Preparedness Day
Parade bombing with Tom Mooney, was denied by the supreme court in
1930.18
The power of executive clemency was used sparingly by California
governors. Earl Warren presided over eighty-five executions during his
eleven years as California Governor; he granted clemency in only eight
cases. 19 Governor Goodwin Knight exercised clemency in six cases, 20
allowing the execution of forty-one others during his five years in office.
A dramatic change took place in 1959, when Edmund G. "Pat" Brown
became governor. Although he had served as District Attorney of San
Francisco and California Attorney General, Brown was philosophically
opposed to the death penalty. The most difficult case confronting him
was that of Caryl Chessman, who had been on San Quentin's death row
since 1948 after being convicted of aggravated kidnapping in Los Angeles
County. Since Chessman was a twice-convicted felon, Brown could not
commute the sentence without supreme court approval, 21 but he could
grant a stay. In 1960, he stayed the execution for sixty days and called
upon the Legislature to repeal the death penalty. The Legislature re-
fused, and Chessman was executed on May 2, 1960. Only thirty-five ex-
ecutions took place while Brown was governor, the last in January of
1963; he exercised the commutation power twenty-three times, or 40%
of the cases that came before him.
22
Since Brown left office in 1967, only one execution has occurred in
California. Four months after Ronald Reagan's election as governor,
Aaron Mitchell, convicted of a Sacramento murder, was executed on
April 12, 1967. The moratorium on executions since that time has been
judicially imposed.
17. Carter, Capital Punishment in California, 1938-53, 1953 (unpublished manuscript sub-
mitted to University of California School of Criminology).
18. In re Billings, 210 Cal. 669, 298 P.2d 1071 (1930).
19. G. UELMEN, CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY LAWS AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME
COURT: A TEN YEAR PERSPECTIVE, Report to California Legislature, Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee 9 (1986).
20. Id.
21. CAL. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1879).
22. Uelmen, supra note 11, at 21; see also E. BROWN, PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE MERCY:
A GOVERNOR'S EDUCATION ON DEATH Row (1989).
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Actually, the judicial moratorium began in 1964, with the case of
People v. Morse.23 The California Supreme Court held that it was error
to instruct a jury deciding the death penalty that, if it did not sentence
the defendant to death, the defendant might be paroled after seven
years.24 This necessitated new penalty trials for all prisoners on death
row. Four years later, the United States Supreme Court's ruling in
Witherspoon v. Illinois2' also required the wholesale retrial of the pen-
alty-phase proceedings of those awaiting execution, because of the exclu-
sion of jurors with general objections to the death penalty.
By December 31, 1971, California had 105 prisoners on death row,
26
awaiting the final ruling on the ultimate constitutional question: Does
the death penalty itself violate the California constitutional prohibition
against cruel or unusual punishment? People v. Anderson 27 answered this
question on February 18, 1972. Writing for a six member majority, Chief
Justice Donald Wright held that "capital punishment is both cruel and
unusual as those terms are defined under article I, section 6, of the Cali-
fornia Constitution, and that therefore death may not be exacted as pun-
ishment for crime in this state."28 Governor Reagan subsequently called
the appointment of Chief Justice Wright "a terrible mistake., 29 Among
the more notorious occupants of death row who escaped execution by
virtue of the Anderson decision were Charles Manson, leader of the cult
which committed the grisly Tate-LaBianca murders, Sirhan Sirhan, who
assassinated Robert F. Kennedy in 1968, and Gregory U. Powell, con-
victed of the execution murder of a Los Angeles police officer in an onion
field near Bakersfield. Public outrage over the opinion was expressed in
the quick enactment of a 1972 constitutional amendment declaring that
the death penalty is neither cruel nor unusual punishment.30
Meanwhile, the United States Supreme Court handed down nine
separate opinions in the case of Furman v. Georgia on June 29, 1972.31
The opinions were widely interpreted as prohibiting discretion in the im-
position of the death penalty. 32 In 1973, the California Legislature re-
23. 60 Cal. 2d 631, 388 P.2d 33, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1964).
24. Id. at 647-48, 388 P.2d at 45-46, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14.
25. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
26. Uelmen, supra note 11, at 21.
27. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
28. Id. at 633, 493 P.2d at 883, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
29. L.A. Times, Aug. 18, 1985, § I, at 26, col. 1.
30. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27 (1973). The amendment was enacted as Proposition 17 by a
67% majority in the election of November 7, 1972. Complete Election Results, CAL. J.
(Supp.), Nov. 1972.
31. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
32. See, e.g., Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capi-
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sponded to the mandate of Proposition 17 and the generally accepted
interpretation of Furman by enacting a mandatory death penalty law
specifically requiring that the death penalty be imposed in all cases of
contract killings, murders of police officers or crime witnesses, multiple
killings, and murders during commission of rape, robbery, burglary, kid-
napping or child molestation. During the next three years, another sixty-
eight persons were sentenced to death in California under this law.
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court held that a mandatory
death penalty was unconstitutional in Woodson v. North Carolina 3 3 and
Roberts v. Louisiana.4 California was among the twenty states that had
enacted mandatory death penalty laws.3" On December 27, 1976, in a
unanimous opinion, the California Supreme Court declared that the Cali-
fornia death penalty law enacted in 1973 was unconstitutional. 6 The
opinion surprised no one, since the United States Supreme Court had
already held that "mandatory" death penalty laws were unconstitu-
tional.37 In the companion cases to Woodson and Roberts, the United
States Supreme Court upheld the "guided discretion" death penalty laws
of Georgia, 38 Florida39 and Texas,' under which the legislature defined
specific special circumstances justifying imposition of the death penalty,
and required the judge or jury to weigh aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors in deciding whether death is the appropriate penalty.41 The Califor-
nia Legislature responded by enacting a new death penalty law carefully
modeled upon the laws upheld by the United States Supreme Court.4"
The new death penalty law was authored by Senator George
Deukmejian. Governor Jerry Brown vetoed the bill, but the Legislature
overrode his veto and enacted the bill effective August 11, 1977. Since
tal Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980); Geimer, Death at Any Cost: A Critique of the
Supreme Court's Recent Retreat from its Death Penalty Standards, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 737,
740-41 (1985); Zimring & Hawkins, Capital Punishment and the Eighth Amendment: Furman
and Gregg in Retrospect, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 927, 932 (1985).
33. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
34. 428 U.S. 325 (1976). In three companion cases to Woodson and Roberts the Court
upheld statutes where the judge or jury had discretion to impose the death penalty. See Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976).
35. See G. UELMEN, supra note 19, at 12.
36. Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 428, 556 P.2d 1101, 1111-12, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 650, 654 (1976).
37. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
38. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
39. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
40. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
41. Id. at 273-76; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255-60; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07.
42. 1977 Cal. Stat. ch. 316, at 1257, § 9 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (repealed
1978)).
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the new law could not be applied "retroactively" to crimes committed
before the date of its enactment on August 11, 1977, California "started
over" in its efforts to implement the death penalty.
Fifteen months later, in November of 1978, the 1977 death penalty
law was repealed and replaced by a new death penalty law that broadly
expanded the categories of cases in which the death penalty could be
imposed.4' The initiative measure, popularly known as the "Briggs Initi-
ative" for its author, Senator John Briggs, was passed by a 72% majority
of the electorate.'
Both the 1977 death penalty law and the 1978 Briggs Initiative re-
quire three separate factual determinations before a judgment of death
may be imposed. First, the defendant must be convicted of an offense
that carries a possible death penalty.4" Such offenses include first-degree
murder,46 sabotage,47 treason,48 perjury procuring the execution of an
innocent person,49 train wrecking,5" and deadly assault by one serving a
life term." Second, if the defendant is convicted of first-degree murder,
the finder of fact must conclude that one of the special circumstances
defined by statute is true.5 2 If a special circumstance is found, a sentence
of death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole must be im-
posed.5" Otherwise, an ordinary sentence of twenty-five years to life,
with eligibility for parole, is imposed. 4 The third factual determination
required is whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating cir-
cumstances, in which case a penalty of death may be imposed.55 Each of
these factual determinations must be upheld upon review by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court before a sentence of death can be carried out.5 6
43. Initiative and Measure Proposition 14, § 5, Nov. 7, 1978 (codified at CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190.2 (West 1988)); see also Historical Note in CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West
1988).
44. Salzman, Election '78 Post Mortem, CAL. J., Dec. 1978, at 386, 390; see also Schwab,
The History of the Death Penalty in California, 4 L.A. LAW. 8, 13 (1981).
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West 1988).
46. Id. § 190.
47. CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 1672 (West 1988).
48. CAL. PENAL CODE § 37 (West 1988).
49. Id. § 128.
50. Id. § 219.
51. Id. § 4500.
52. Id. § 190.1(b). A conviction of sabotage, treason, perjury procuring execution, train
wrecking or assault by a person serving a life term does not require additional "special circum-
stances," id. § 190.3, but virtually all death penalty cases in California have involved a charge
of first-degree murder.
53. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1988).
54. Id. § 190.3.
55. Id.
56. Id. § 190.4.
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III. THE UNDERLYING CONVICTION-THE "GUILT PHASE"
Of the sixty-four death penalty judgments reviewed with finality by
the Bird court, the conviction of guilt of first-degree murder was affirmed
in forty-two, or 65.6% of the cases.57 Thirty-five of the affirmances, or
83.3%, were unanimous. Of the twenty-two reversals, only eight, or
36.3%, were unanimous.
Of the seventy-one death penalty judgments reviewed with finality
by the Lucas court through March of 1989, the conviction of guilt of
first-degree murder was affirmed in sixty-seven, or 94.4% of the cases. 8
Sixty-two of the affirmances, or 91.2%, were unanimous. Three of the
four reversals were unanimous.
The affirmance rates of the Lucas and Bird courts might be com-
pared to the affirmance rate for all criminal appeals heard by the courts
of appeal. That rate is higher than the Bird court death penalty rate and
lower than the Lucas court rate. In fiscal year 1986-1987, 81% of the
criminal convictions reviewed by the courts of appeal were affirmed in
full, while another 12% were affirmed with modifications.5 9 However,
the rate may vary significantly among various divisions of the courts of
appeal. A 1984 study disclosed that the affirmance rate for criminal ap-
peals heard by the seven divisions of the Second District Court of Appeal
of California varied from 73% to 87%.'0
How do the affirmance rates of the Bird and Lucas courts compare
with the conviction affirmance rate in death penalty cases reviewed by
the supreme courts of other states? While complete data has not been
compiled in many other states, figures are available for the period 1972-
1982 in Florida.6" Florida's 1972 death penalty law was upheld by the
United States Supreme Court in 1976, and the Florida Supreme Court
has reviewed more death penalty judgments in recent years than any
other court.62 Of 145 cases reviewed up to 1982, a total of seventy were
reversed, but only twenty of these were remanded for new trials on the
issue of guilt.63 The other fifty cases were reversals only of the death
57. See infra Appendix, Table 2, Table 5.
58. See infra Appendix, Table 3, Table 6.
59. This affirmance rate of 93% is higher than comparable. rates reported for intermediate
appellate courts in other states such as Texas (83%), New Jersey (84%), and Illinois (77%).
Kanner & Uelmen, Random Assignment, Random Justice, 6 L.A. LAW., Feb. 1984, at 10, 15.
60. Id. at 17.
61. See Radelet & Vandiver, The Florida Supreme Court and Death Penalty Appeals, 74 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 913 (1983).
62. Id. at 916.
63. Id. at 919.
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penalty.' Thus, the comparable rate of affirmance of the conviction of
guilt in death penalty cases for the Florida Supreme Court is 86.6%,
substantially higher than the 65.6% posted by the Bird court and some-
what lower than the 94.4% posted by the Lucas court.
A. Competency of Defense Counsel
Of the twenty-two death penalty cases in which the Bird court re-
versed the conviction of guilt,65 the reversals in nine cases" were based
on issues related to the role of defense counsel in capital cases. In four
cases, the court unanimously concluded the defendant was deprived of
the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the federal and state
constitutions.67 In three of these cases, the court found that the incom-
petency of retained counsel deprived the defendants of the effective
assistance of counsel.68 In the fourth case, a conflict of interest in joint
representation of two defendants by the same contract public defender
necessitated reversal. 69 Two other convictions were reversed due to dep-
rivation of the defendant's rights to self-representation under Faretta v.
California.7° In People v. Joseph,71 the court held that the trial court
erred by applying a higher standard of competency to waive counsel in
capital cases than in non-capital cases. 72 In People v. BigeloW, 73 the court
held that the trial court erred in concluding that it lacked discretion to
appoint advisory counsel for a defendant who elected to represent him-
64. Id.
65. See infra Appendix, Table 5.
66. People v. Ledesma, 43 Cal. 3d 171, 729 P.2d 839, 233 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1987); People v.
Massie, 40 Cal. 3d 620, 709 P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1985); People v. Bigelow, 37 Cal.
3d 731, 691 P.2d 994, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1984); People v. Mroczko, 35 Cal. 3d 86, 672 P.2d
835, 197 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1983); People v. Joseph, 34 Cal. 3d 936, 671 P.2d 843, 196 Cal. Rptr.
339 (1983); People v. Mozingo, 34 Cal. 3d 926, 671 P.2d 363, 196 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1983);
People v. Gzikowski, 32 Cal. 3d 580, 651 P.2d 1145, 186 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1982); People v.
Chadd, 28 Cal. 3d 739, 621 P.2d 837, 170 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1981); People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d
142, 599 P.2d 587, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1979).
67. Ledesma, 43 Cal. 3d at 171, 729 P.2d at 839, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 404; Mroczko, 35 Cal.
3d at 86, 672 P.2d at 835, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 52; Mozingo, 34 Cal. 3d at 926, 671 P.2d at 363,
196 Cal. Rptr. at 212; Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d at 142, 599 P.2d at 587, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
68. Ledesma, 43 Cal. 3d at 223, 729 P.2d at 873, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 439; Mozingo, 34 Cal.
3d at 935, 671 P.2d at 368, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 217; Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d at 166, 599 P.2d at 601,
158 Cal. Rptr. at 294-95.
69. Mroczko, 35 Cal. 3d at 13, 672 P.2d at 852, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
70. Bigelow, 37 Cal. 3d at 743, 691 P.2d at 1000, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 334 (citing Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)); Joseph, 34 Cal. 3d at 945, 671 P.2d at 848, 196 Cal. Rptr. at
344 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)).
71. 34 Cal. 3d 936, 671 P.2d 843, 196 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1983).
72. Id. at 945, 671 P.2d at 848, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
73. 37 Cal. 3d 731, 691 P.2d 994, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1984).
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self.74 Both of these holdings were also unanimous.7 Still another unan-
imous reversal was based on deprivation of the defendant's right to
counsel of his choice, when the trial court refused a continuance to per-
mit the defendant to select a replacement for an experienced trial lawyer
who withdrew as co-counsel on the eve of trial.
76
Two more convictions were reversed by a vote of five to two because
the requirements of California Penal Code section 1018 were not ob-
served.7 7 Section 1018 requires the consent of defense counsel to a plea
of guilty entered in a capital case.78 In People v. Chadd,79 the dissenters
urged that section 1018 be declared unconstitutional.80 In People v. Mas-
sie,"' the dissenters argued that the reluctant concurrence of defense
counsel in a plea entered before Chadd was decided was sufficient to
comply with section 1018.82
The Lucas court has been much less hospitable to claims related to
the competence of defense counsel. It has yet to reverse a guilt determi-
nation on that ground,83 and many of the dissents to affirmances have
objected to the short shrift given this issue. In People v. Wade,84 the
court affirmed the conviction of a defendant whose counsel apologized to
the jury for having to defend him, and recounted that his wife had placed
flowers on the grave of the victim.85 Dissenting Justice Broussard chal-
lenged the majority's conclusion that these were "legitimate tactical deci-
sions," noting counsel's failure to offer any argument in the sanity phase
of the trial.8 6 A conflict of interest claim was rejected in People v.
Bonin,87 where an allegation that counsel had a fee agreement giving him
literary rights to defendant's story was not investigated by the trial
74. Id. at 743, 691 P.2d at 1000, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
75. Id. at 756, 691 P.2d at 1009-10, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 343; Joseph, 34 Cal. 3d at 948, 671
P.2d at 850-51, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
76. Gzikowski, 32 Cal. 3d at 589, 651 P.2d at 1151, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
77. Massie, 40 Cal. 3d at 622, 709 P.2d at 1310-1311, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 142; Chadd, 28
Cal. 3d at 743, 621 P.2d at 839, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
78. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1018 (West 1988).
79. 28 Cal. 3d 739, 621 P.2d 837, 170 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1981).
80. Id. at 759, 621 P.2d at 848-49, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 810 (Richardson, J., dissenting in
part).
81. 40 Cal. 3d 620, 709 P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1985).
82. Id. at 626-27, 709 P.2d at 1314, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (Lucas, J., dissenting in part).
83. But see In re Sixto, 48 Cal. 3d 1247, 774 P.2d 169, 259 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1989). In this
case, decided after the period covered in this Article, the court granted a petition for habeas
corpus by a death row inmate on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.
84. 44 Cal. 3d 975, 750 P.2d 794, 244 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1987).
85. Id. at 987, 1000, 750 P.2d at 800, 809, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 911, 920.
86. Id. at 1000, 750 P.2d at 809, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 920 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
87. 47 Cal. 3d 808, 765 P.2d 460, 254 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1989).
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court."8 Again, Justice Broussard dissented.8 9
Faretta-related claims were rejected over dissents in two cases. In
People v. Crandell,9 ° the court held that failure to appoint advisory coun-
sel upon request of a defendant who was representing himself was not
reversible error.91 The majority opinion by Justice Kaufman seized on
language in People v. Bigelow92 that such a failure should result in auto-
matic reversal where it is an abuse of discretion.93 Justice Kaufman con-
cluded that the trial court simply failed to exercise discretion; however, if
it had, its refusal to appoint advisory counsel would not have been an
abuse.9 4 Dissenting Justices Arguelles, Broussard and Mosk contended
that the majority was discounting the significance of the capital nature of
a case in applying the Bigelow rule.95 Crandell offers a stark example of
the "norm of affirmance" in operation, where deference is given to the
discretion of the trial judge even when the trial judge actually failed to
exercise discretion.96 The second case involving a Faretta claim involved
a defendant who asserted his right to self-representation on the eve of
trial.97 The claim was rejected as untimely. 98
The difference in the fate of incompetence of counsel claims between
the Bird and Lucas courts underlines the differing models of review. If
counsel's performance is found truly inadequate, the ordinary conse-
quence should be reversal. It has been estimated that 15-20% of trial
representation in California death penalty cases is "significantly substan-
dard."9 9 Less than 2% of death row inmates are represented by retained
counsel."°° Rates of payment for appointed counsel and the pressures
imposed on lawyers who accept such appointments are hardly configured
to attract the best lawyers. Although many claims of incompetence are
88. Id. at 838, 765 P.2d at 475-76, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 313-14.
89. Id. at 858-62, 765 P.2d at 490-92, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 328-30 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
90. 46 Cal. 3d 833, 760 P.2d 423, 251 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1936
(1989).
91. Id. at 851, 760 P.2d at 432, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
92. 37 Cal. 3d 731, 691 P.2d 994, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1984).
93. Crandell, 46 Cal. 3d at 861, 760 P.2d at 436, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 240 (citing People v.
Bigelow, 37 Cal. 3d 731, 691 P.2d 994, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1984)).
94. Id. at 862-63, 760 P.2d at 437-38, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 240-41.
95. Id. at 888, 760 P.2d at 461, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 258 (Arguelles, J., dissenting in part); id.
at 898-900, 760 P.2d at 461-63, 251 Cal. Rptr. 265-67 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
96. Davies, supra note 3, at 606.
97. People v. Moore, 47 Cal. 3d 63, 78-79, 762 P.2d 1218, 1226, 252 Cal. Rptr. 494, 502
(1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2442 (1989).
98. Id. at 80, 762 P.2d at 1227, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
99. Millman, Financing the Right to Counsel in Capital Cases, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 383,
385 (1985).
100. Id. at 384.
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yet to be litigated in habeas corpus proceedings, the Lucas court appears
ready to dispose of these claims as readily as they are disposed of by the
courts of appeal:
Probably the best example of an insurmountable standard is
found in an issue frequently raised in criminal appeals, inade-
quate representation by trial counsel. If representation were
found to be inadequate, that would normally require reversal,
but inadequate representation is seldom found. In any trial,
counsel makes tactical and strategic decisions about what evi-
dence and arguments to present and what to omit or downplay.
Thus, on the basis of a cold record it is often difficult to say
with any confidence whether an apparent blunder or omission
was the result of incompetence or of design. The legal doctrine
typically applied in the appeals studied avoided the need to
make those difficult judgments, however, by setting the stan-
dard for review such that competence is presumed unless the
representation is so bad that the proceeding amounts to little
more than a "farce or a sham."
101
While the standard being applied by both the Bird and Lucas courts was
ostensibly the same standard set by the United States Supreme Court, 1
0 2
the results have changed dramatically. In this arena, the explanation
does not appear to be entirely the harmless error rule, but a difference in
the willingness to attribute "a wide variety of apparent failings of counsel
... as 'trial strategy.' ,13
B. Admissibility of Evidence
The second largest category of reversals of convictions of guilt by
the Bird court, eight cases," was based on the erroneous admission or
exclusion of evidence on the issue of guilt. Three of these cases involved
the erroneous admission of out-of-court statements by the defendant. In
101. Davies, supra note 3, at 606-07 (footnotes omitted). Davies found a claim of inadequte
representation succeeded in only two of the 118 cases in which it was raised (1.7%).
102. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under the standard set out in
Strickland, a defendant must show that the outcome would "reasonably likely" have been
different but for counsel's incompetence. Id. at 696.
103. Davies, supra note 3, at 607.
104. People v. Louis, 42 Cal. 3d 969, 728 P.2d 180, 232 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1986); People v.
Bigelow, 37 Cal. 3d 731, 691 P.2d 994, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1984); People v. Holt, 37 Cal. 3d
436, 690 P.2d 1207, 208 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1984); People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d
709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984); People v. Mattson, 37 Cal. 3d 85, 688 P.2d 889, 207 Cal. Rptr.
278 (1984); People v. Alcala, 36 Cal. 3d 604, 685 P.2d 1126, 205 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1984); People
v. Arcega, 32 Cal. 3d 504, 651 P.2d 338, 186 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1982); People v. Hogan, 31 Cal. 3d
815, 649 P.2d 93, 183 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1982).
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People v. Hogan," 5 the defendant's statements were found involun-
tary.106 In People v. Mattson,10 7 the court concluded that the defendant's
statements were elicited in violation of Miranda v. Arizona.1 0 8 In People
v. Arcega,'0 9 the court found that statements made by the defendant to a
psychiatrist conducting a competency examination were erroneously ad-
mitted in violation of the defendant's constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination." 0 Justices Mosk and Richardson dissented in Hogan''
and Arcega," 2 while Justices Kaus and Grodin dissented from Justice
Mosk's majority opinion in Mattson.
1 13
Three other convictions were overturned because of erroneous ad-
mission of prior criminal conduct of the defendant. In People v. Al-
cala,"4 the defendant's convictions of three prior abductions of young
girls were erroneously admitted to show the defendant's identity as the
perpetrator of the charged abduction and murder. 15  In People v.
Holt," 6 one basis for reversal was that the defendant's prior convictions
of burglary and prison escape were erroneously admitted to impeach his
testimony at trial." 7 Both cases were decided five to one, with Justice
Mosk dissenting in each case." 8 In a third case,119 reversed for failure to
consider appointment of advisory counsel for a defendant who elected to
represent himself, the court also concluded that evidence of the defend-
ant's other crimes was erroneously admitted. 2
105. 31 Cal. 3d 815, 649 P.2d 93, 183 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1982).
106. Id. at 840-41, 647 P.2d at 107-08, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32.
107. 37 Cal. 3d 85, 688 P.2d 886, 207 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1984).
108. Ird. at 91, 688 P.2d at 889-90, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 281-82 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966)).
109. 32 Cal. 3d 504, 651 P.2d 338, 186 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1982).
110. Id. at 523, 651 P.2d at 347, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
111. Hogan, 31 Cal. 3d at 859-64, 647 P.2d at 119-22, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 843-46 (Richardson
& Mosk, JJ., dissenting).
112. Arcega, 32 Cal. 3d at 531-34, 651 P.2d at 352-55, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 108-11 (Richardson
& Mosk, JJ., dissenting).
113. Mattson, 37 Cal. 3d at 94-96, 688 P.2d at 892-94, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 283-85 (Kaus &
Grodin, J., dissenting).
114. 36 Cal. 3d 604, 685 P.2d 1126, 205 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1984).
115. Id. at 634, 685 P.2d at 1142-43, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
116. 37 Cal. 3d 436, 690 P.2d 1207, 208 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1984).
117. Id. at 454, 690 P.2d at 1217, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 557. It would appear that the enact-
ment of Proposition 8 in June, 1982, would change one basis for the result in Holt, permitting
use of all prior felonies involving "moral turpitude" to impeach the defendant's testimony. See
People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 315, 696 P.2d 111, 119, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719, 727 (1985).
118. Holt, 37 Cal. 3d at 462-64, 690 P.2d at 1223-24, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 563-64 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting in part); Alcala, 36 Cal. 3d at 636-37, 685 P.2d at 1144-45, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 793-94
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
119. Bigelow, 37 Cal. 3d at 731, 691 P.2d at 994, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
120. Id. at 747, 691 P.2d at 1003, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
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In two more cases, the Bird court reduced a first-degree murder
conviction to second degree, in part due to the erroneous exclusion of
expert testimony, 121 and reversed a conviction because the hearsay testi-
mony of a missing preliminary hearing witness was admitted without a
sufficient showing of "due diligence" by the prosecution to locate him. 2'
The first case was a unanimous opinion, 12 3 but the second case produced
a four-to-three split on the court, with Justices Grodin, Panelli and Lu-
cas dissenting.' 4
Justice Mosk dissented in half of the Bird court reversals based on
admission of evidence, in many instances because he concluded the errors
were harmless.' 25 Many of his concurrences in Lucas court affirmances
are on the same basis.
12 6
In contrast to the eight reversals by the Bird court based on errone-
ous admission of evidence, only one death judgment has been reversed by
the Lucas court on that ground. In People v. Boyer,127 by a vote of five to
two, the court reversed a judgment of guilt on the grounds that admis-
sion of the defendant's confession violated the rule of Miranda v. Ari-
zona.' 28 In several other cases, the court has found that evidence was
erroneously admitted, but its admission was harmless error. 1 29 The court
has rarely relied upon Proposition 8 to uphold the admission of evidence
that would have been excluded before the initiative's enactment in
1982.130
121. People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 355, 690 P.2d 709, 711, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 238
(1984).
122. People v. Louis, 42 Cal. 3d 969, 990-94, 728 P.2d 180, 193-95, 232 Cal. Rptr. 110, 123-
25 (1986).
123. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 351, 690 P.2d at 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
124. Louis, 42 Cal. 3d at 969, 728 P.2d at 180, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
125. See, e.g., Holt, 37 Cal. 3d at 462, 690 P.2d at 1223, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 563 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting); Alcala, 36 Cal. 3d at 636, 685 P.2d at 1144, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 793 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting); Arcega, 32 Cal. 3d at 531, 651 P.2d at 352, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 108 (Mosk, J., dis-
senting); Hogan, 31 Cal. 3d at 859, 647 P.2d at 119, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 843 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
126. See, eg., People v. Bunyard, 45 Cal. 3d 1189, 1200, 756 P.2d 795, 801, 249 Cal. Rptr.
71, 77 (1988) (Mosk, J., concurring); People v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 1114, 742 P.2d
1306, 1309, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588 (1987) (Mosk, J., concurring).
127. 48 Cal. 3d 247, 768 P.2d 610, 256 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1989).
128. Id. at 280, 768 P.2d at 629, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 115 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966)).
129. See, e.g., People v. Coleman, 46 Cal. 3d 749, 774-76, 759 P.2d 1260, 1276-77, 251 Cal.
Rptr. 63, 99-101 (1988) (Kelly-Frye violation); People v. Bunyard, 45 Cal. 3d 1189, 1203, 756
P.2d 795, 803, 249 Cal. Rptr. 71, 79 (1988) (hearsay); People v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104,
1129, 742 P.2d 1306, 1319, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 598 (1987) (Bruton error).
130. As of this date, few of the cases reviewed involve murders that occurred after June
1982, when Proposition 8 took effect.
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The Lucas court results are remarkably consistent with those re-
ported for the routine processing of criminal appeals by the intermediate
courts of appeal:
Issues where either the harmless error rule or the substantial
error rule are likely to apply had very low success rates:
prosecutorial misconduct (4.1%), admission of prejudicial evi-
dence (2.8%), improperly obtained statements-Miranda is-
sues (1.8%), and improper identification procedures (0%).
Note too, that these four issues have harmless error rates of
39.0%, 21.8%, 4.5%, and 11.9%, respectively. Clearly the
harmless error rule has a significant impact on these issues, es-
pecially prosecutorial misconduct and admission of prejudicial
evidence.
13 1
The functioning of the harmless error rule as a norm of affirmance
was the focus of major attention in Davies' study of decision-making by
the court of appeal. His observations are especially pertinent to review of
evidentiary issues in capital cases by the Lucas court:
The harmless error rule has two important implications for ap-
pellate supervision. First, it is a norm of affirmance; unless an
error is clearly prejudicial, the rule calls for the Court of Ap-
peal to affirm. This is especially so since the burden of showing
prejudice is usually placed on the appellant ....
The second implication of the harmless error rule lies in
the discretion it confers on the Court of Appeal. Because the
harmfulness or harmlessness of an error is very difficult to spec-
ify with precision, the harmless error rule allows the Court of
Appeal a substantial latitude of choice in determining whether
to reverse any individual case. Hence, while it creates a general
tendency to affirm, the prejudicial error rule also gives the
Court of Appeal a flexible intellectual framework for choosing
whether to ignore or to pounce on errors made during the
trial.
132
Several justices interviewed by Davies noted how the "harmless error"
rule waxed and waned on an almost cyclical basis. One study of federal
appellate courts found the rate of harmless error issues in criminal ap-
peals increased four-fold in a ten-year period. 133 Davies also points out
how frequently the rule is used "to bypass determining whether a legal
131. Davies, supra note 3, at 617-18 (footnotes omitted).
132. Id. at 602-03 (footnotes omitted).
133. Winslow, Harmful Use of Harmless Error in Criminal Cases, 64 CORNELL L. REV.
538, 545 (1979).
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error occurred at all by jumping to a finding that even if there were an
error it would be harmless."
' 134
C. Jury Selection
Issues relating to jury selection are particularly significant in capital
cases, since the jury makes the ultimate choice between life and death. 1
35
The United States Supreme Court has issued a number of major opin-
ions, not all consistent with each other, regarding the exclusion of jurors
with scruples against the death penalty.136 One of the most controversial
rulings of the Bird court related to the voir dire procedure in capital
cases. 137
In reviewing the underlying conviction of guilt, the Bird court re-
versed two convictions because of errors in the jury selection procedure.
In People v. Harris,'38 the conviction was set aside on a four-to-three vote
because the defendant was not given a full hearing on his claim that mi-
norities were underrepresented in the jury pool from which jurors were
drawn.'39 The challenge to Los Angeles County's use of voter registra-
tion lists as the sole source of prospective jurors produced a badly splin-
tered court, with Justice Grodin reluctantly concurring without
accepting all of the reasoning of Justice Broussard's majority opinion.14
0
In People v. Turner,'' a unanimous court reversed the conviction of a
black defendant for the murders of two white professionals because the
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove all three black ju-
rors was inadequately explained.142 The court's prior decision in People
v. Wheeler 43 imposed a burden of justification on the prosecutor once a
prima facie showing of group bias is made.'"
The Lucas court reversed one conviction on Wheeler grounds, re-
134. Davies, supra note 3, at 604.
135. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4 (West 1988).
136. Compare Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) with Wainwright v. Witt, 469
U.S. 412 (1985).
137. Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 80, 616 P.2d 1301, 1354, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128,
181 (1980).
138. 36 Cal. 3d 36, 679 P.2d 433, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984).
139. Id. at 71, 679 P.2d at 455, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 804. In People v. Myers, 43 Cal. 3d 250,
256, 729 P.2d 698, 700, 233 Cal. Rptr. 264, 265 (1987), the court declined to hold Harris
retroactive.
140. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d at 71, 679 P.2d at 455, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 804 (Grodin, J.,
concurring).
141. 42 Cal. 3d 711, 726 P.2d 102, 230 Cal. Rptr. 656 (1986).
142. Id. at 720, 726 P.2d at 106-07, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 660-61.
143. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
144. Id. at 281-82, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906. The United States Supreme
Court adopted a similar rule in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The differences be-
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jecting an argument that prosecutorial discrimination in excusing black
jurors can be justified by defense tactics of excusing white jurors. 145 In
People v. Snow, a unanimous court agreed that the use of six of sixteen
peremptories to excuse black jurors was discriminatory. 47 In another
case, the court rejected a Wheeler claim, concluding that the prosecutor's
explanations for using peremptory challenges to remove three black ju-
rors, four Jewish jurors, and two Asian jurors were sufficient to meet his
burden ofjustification.148 The majority seized the occasion to specifically
disapprove a Bird-era precedent disallowing the prosecutor's subjective
reactions to juror body language and mode of answering as adequate
grounds for justification of peremptory challenges. 149 As noted by Jus-
tice Panelli in his majority opinion, "we hereby return to a standard of
truly giving great deference to the trial court in distinguishing bona fide
reasons from sham excuses."' 50 In dissent, Justices Mosk and Broussard
chastised the majority for paying lip service to the Wheeler/Batson rule
while violating both its letter and spirit.'
The exaltation of greater deference to trial judges as justification for
diluting Wheeler/Batson requirements is quite consistent with the ap-
proach of an intermediate appellate court to the review of routine crimi-
nal cases, as described by Davies:
[T]he justices spoke of trial court judges more as fellow profes-
sionals than as subordinates. Hence, they defined their supervi-
sory function primarily in terms of writing opinions that would
assist trial judges in resolving questions. They approached the
court system as though it were a self-correcting institution, and
they believed that rules would be followed if they were clear.
This premise is difficult to square with much of the literature
describing trial court processes-or with some of the justices'
own observations about conditions in the trial courts. Never-
theless, this passive and restrained form of supervision is all
tween Wheeler and Batson are explained in Uelmen, Striking Jurors Under Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 2 CRIM. JuST., Fall 1987, at 2.
145. People v. Snow, 44 Cal. 3d 216, 225, 746 P.2d 452, 456, 242 Cal. Rptr. 477, 481
(1987).
146. 44 Cal. 3d 216, 746 P.2d 452, 242 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1987).
147. Id. at 226, 746 P.2d at 457, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
148. People v. Johnson, 47 Cal. 3d 1194, 1217-18, 767 P.2d 1047, 1054-55, 255 Cal. Rptr.
569, 576-77 (1989).
149. Id. at 1219-22, 767 P.2d at 1056-58, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 578-80.
150. Id. at 1221, 767 P.2d at 1057, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
151. Id. at 1254, 767 P.2d at 1079, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 601 (Mosk & Broussard, JJ.,
dissenting).
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that the institutional norms of the court of appeal allow.1 52
D. Competency of the Defendant
The Bird court followed a rule of per se reversals for denial of a
hearing on the competency of the defendant to stand trial, once the de-
fendant produced "substantial evidence" of incompetency. 153 In People
v. Stankewitz,154 the court concluded by a four-to-two vote that the "sub-
stantial evidence" test was met by the testimony of a single, court-ap-
pointed psychiatrist. 55
Two of the four reversals of the conviction of guilt by the Lucas
court have resulted from failures to conduct competency hearings.156
Both decisions were unanimous. 57 Both involved a failure by the trial
judge to conduct a competency hearing after expressing doubts as to the
competency of the defendant based on psychiatric reports) 5 8 Thus, the
prosecution had no room to argue that the "substantial evidence" test
was not met. The rulings were formulated in jurisdictional terms, hold-
ing that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to proceed until the competency
hearing is concluded. 59
E. Miscellaneous
The remaining reversals of underlying convictions of guilt by the
Bird court were based on a variety of grounds, including erroneous jury
instructions,1 60 failure to grant a severance of counts,1 61 misconduct by a
152. Davies, supra note 3, at 611 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
153. See People v. Pennington, 66 Cal. 2d 508, 517-20, 426 P.2d 942, 949-51, 58 Cal. Rptr.
374, 381-83 (1967).
154. 32 Cal. 3d 80, 648 P.2d 578, 184 Cal. Rptr. 611 (1982).
155. Id. at 92, 648 P.2d at 584, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
156. People v. Marks, 45 Cal. 3d 1335, 1340, 756 P.2d 260, 264, 248 Cal. Rptr. 874, 877
(1988); People v. Hale, 44 Cal. 3d 531, 538-39, 749 P.2d 769, 773-74, 244 Cal. Rptr. 114, 118-
19 (1988).
157. Marks, 45 Cal. 3d at 1335, 756 P.2d at 260, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 874; Hale, 44 Cal. 3d at
531, 749 P.2d at 769, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 114.
158. Marks, 45 Cal. 3d at 1338, 756 P.2d at 263, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 876-77; Hale, 44 Cal. 3d
at 538, 749 P.2d at 773, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
159. Marks, 45 Cal. 3d at 1340, 756 P.2d at 264, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 877; Hale, 44 Cal. 3d at
541, 749 P.2d at 775, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
160. People v. Croy, 41 Cal. 3d 1, 14, 710 P.2d 392, 400, 221 Cal. Rptr. 592, 599.600
(1985).
161. People v. Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d 415, 433, 722 P.2d 197, 208, 228 Cal. Rptr. 913, 925
(1986).
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juror,"' and denial of pretrial discovery.' 63 Then-Justice Lucas wrote
dissenting opinions in three of these four cases. He argued that the erro-
neous jury instructions were harmless,"6 that the denial of severance was
not an abuse of discretion,165 and that the jury misconduct had been
waived by a failure to promptly assert it.'66 He also joined in Justice
Grodin's dissent in the fourth case, urging a limited remand rather than
an outright reversal.' 67
The Lucas court now uses these procedural arguments often to re-
ject similar claims. In People v. Bean,168 for example, over the dissent of
Justices Broussard and Mosk, the court rejected the defendant's claim
that the denial of severance of counts was an abuse of discretion. 169 In
People v. Dyer, 70 the court rejected the per se reversal rule for erroneous
aiding and abetting instructions previously utilized by the Bird court.' 7 '
F. Summary of Underlying Conviction Cases
By increased reliance on such concepts as harmless error and
waiver, and greater deference to trial court discretion, the Lucas court
has increased the affirmance rate for the underlying conviction of guilt
from 65.6% to 94.4%, 172 an even higher rate than that for routine crimi-
nal cases reviewed by the intermediate courts of appeal.' 73 Little or no
change in legal doctrine or rules accompanied this substantial increase in
the affirmance rate. The low rate of affirmance by the Bird court cost
them dearly, in terms of the level of support for the court among trial
judges. A majority of California trial judges voted with the majority of
162. In re Stankewitz, 40 Cal. 3d 391, 402, 708 P.2d 1260, 1266, 220 Cal. Rptr. 382, 388
(1985). Stankewitz was the only case in which the Bird court set aside the underlying convic-
tion on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus rather than on direct review.
163. People v. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d 658, 684, 700 P.2d 446, 464, 214 Cal. Rptr. 832, 850
(1985).
164. Croy, 41 Cal. 3d at 25-26, 710 P.2d at 407-08, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 607-08 (Lucas, J.,
dissenting).
165. Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d at 433-36, 722 P.2d at 208-10, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 925-27 (Lucas,
J., dissenting).
166. Stankewitz, 40 Cal. 3d at 403-05, 708 P.2d at 1266-67, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 389 (Lucas, J.,
dissenting).
167. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d at 705-10, 700 P.2d at 479-82, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 865-68 (Grodin, J.,
dissenting).
168. 46 Cal. 3d 919, 760 P.2d 996, 251 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1988).
169. Id. at 935-36, 760 P.2d at 1005, 467 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
170. 45 Cal. 3d 26, 753 P.2d 1, 246 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 330
(1989).
171. Id. at 64, 753 P.2d at 23, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
172. Compare Table 5 with Table 6 at Appendix infra.
173. See supra text accompanying note 60.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Californians to remove the Chief Justice in 1986.174 Not surprisingly, the
new court places deference to trial judge determinations .higher on its
agenda. Deference to lower courts is consistent with the institutional
roots for the norms of affirmance identified by Davies at the court of
appeal level:
There are two likely institutional roots for the norms of defer-
ence to the trial court's prior decision. First, simply in terms of
economy and the need to reach a final decision, there are bene-
fits to the court system in not unnecessarily doubling work by
redeciding issues. Indeed, since the appellate court often has
less information before it than the trial court had, there are sub-
stantial reasons to doubt that a de novo decision by the appel-
late court would necessarily be an improvement over the trial
court decision. These considerations underlie the strong em-
phasis on values of "finality" in the judicial administration
literature.
There appears to be a second institutional source of appel-
late deference to the trial courts, however. That is simply that
it is to the institutional advantage of an intermediate appellate
court to minimize conflict with the trial courts .... The ap-
proval of the judges of other courts and of various bar groups
and state officials-or at least the absence of overt criticism
from those sources-is the primary means the courts of appeal
have for demonstrating their satisfactory performance.
75
The pressures identified by Davies are at their absolute height in
reviewing the conviction of guilt in a capital case. The cost of reversal on
this issue is enormous, both in terms of the expense of retrial and the
morale of trial judges. On the other hand, reversals on the penalty issue
involve significantly less cost, as well as less risk that the defendant will
be freed. Thus, it should not be surprising that judgments of guilt in the
most complex murder trials are affirmed at a higher rate than very ordi-
nary criminal cases. 176 This result may well be because the "norms of
affirmance" exert their strongest influence to treat errors as non-revers-
ible in precisely those cases where the costs of reversal are highest.
IV. THE FINDING OF SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
Under both the 1977 law and the 1978 Briggs Initiative, a sentence
174. Note, Judiciary Elections-The 1986 Elections for the California Supreme Court, 9
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 751, 752 (1986).
175. Davies, supra note 3, at 592-93 (footnotes omitted).
176. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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of death or life without parole can be imposed for first-degree murder
only if the fact finder concludes that one or more of the special circum-
stances specified in California Penal Code section 190.2 exists.177 Recog-
nizing that not all first-degree murders merit the ultimate penalty of
death, the special circumstances contribute to the fulfillment of the con-
stitutional mandate of the United States Supreme Court that discretion
be directed and limited to provide a "meaningful basis for distinguishing
the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many
cases in which it is not."' 78 The special circumstance must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. 7 9 With a prior conviction of murder as the
sole exception, the fact finder decides the truth of the special circum-
stance at the same time that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
defendant on the underlying murder charge. 180 If a verdict of guilty is
returned with a finding that one or more special circumstances exists, the
jury (or judge, if jury is waived) then proceeds in a separate hearing to
decide whether a punishment of death or life without parole should be
imposed.'1
8
When a death penalty judgment is reviewed on automatic appeal to
the California Supreme Court, the court ordinarily has no occasion to
review the finding of special circumstances if it reverses the underlying
conviction. The case is remanded for a new trial to redetermine both
guilt of the underlying charge and the truth of special circumstances. 182
If the underlying conviction is affirmed, however, the court must still
review the finding of special circumstances.1 83 If the finding of special
circumstances is reversed, the case is usually remanded for a new trial
limited to the issue of the truth of the "special circumstances." However,
remand may be precluded by the constitutional prohibition of double
jeopardy if the finding of special circumstances is reversed due to insuffi-
ciency of the evidence.' 84
Of the sixty-four death penalty judgments reviewed on automatic
appeal by the Bird court from 1979 through 1986,185 the court affirmed
the conviction and proceeded to review the findings of special circum-
177. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4 (repealed 1978); id. (West 1988).
178. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313
(1972) (White, J., concurring).
179. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4 (West 1988).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. M. MILLMAN, THE CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY DEFENSE MANUAL (1989).
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303, 611 P.2d 883, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289
(1980).
185. See infra Appendix, Table 5.
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stances in forty-two cases.' 86 Of those forty-two cases, the court reversed
twenty-one (50%) of the findings of special circumstances.187 All but
four of these reversals, however, were in cases tried under the 1978
Briggs Initiative.' 88 While the special circumstances provisions of the
1977 law emerged virtually unscathed from the process of judicial re-
view, 61.5% of the cases tried under the Briggs Initiative in which con-
victions were affirmed were reversed due to error in the finding of special
circumstances.18 9 Most of these reversals were due to the same error:
failure to instruct the jury of the need to find intent to kill where "felony-
murder" special circumstances were utilized, as required by Carlos v. Su-
perior Court.190
One of the first death penalty decisions issued by the Lucas court
overruled Carlos.'9 In subsequent cases, the finding of special circum-
stances necessary to support a death judgment has rarely been disturbed.
Of the seventy-one death penalty judgments reviewed by the Lucas court
up to March 1989,192 the court has affirmed the conviction and pro-
ceeded to review the findings of special circumstances in sixty-seven
cases.' 93 Of those sixty-seven cases, only one has resulted in total rever-
sal of the findings of special circumstances.194 That single case arose
under the 1977 law.' 95 Thus, in reviewing findings of special circum-
stances under the Briggs Initiative, the record went from 61.5% reversal
to 100% affirmance. While this remarkable turnaround is largely attrib-
utable to the overruling of Carlos, we will see other examples where the
"norms of affirmance" readily explain the difference. Rarely does more
than one voice dissent to these dispositions.
186. See infra Appendix, Table 1, Table 3. In one case reviewed under the 1978 Briggs
Initiative, the court reviewed and reversed the finding of special circumstances after reversing
the underlying conviction. People v. Bigelow, 37 Cal. 3d 731, 691 P.2d 994, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328
(1984).
187. See infra Appendix, Table 2, Table 5.
188. People v. Frierson, 39 Cal. 3d 803, 705 P.2d 396, 218 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1985); People v.
Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303, 611 P.2d 883, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1980); People v. Green, 27 Cal.
3d 1, 609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980); People v. Teron, 23 Cal. 3d 103, 588 P.2d 773, 151
Cal. Rptr. 633 (1979).
189. See infra Appendix, Table 2, Table 5.
190. 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983).
191. People v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 1147, 742 P.2d 1325, 1331, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585,
611 (1987) (overruling Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr.
79 (1983)).
192. See infra Appendix, Table 6.
193. Id.
194. People v. Morris, 46 Cal. 3d 1, 756 P.2d 843, 249 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1988).
195. Id. at 9, 756 P.2d at 847, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
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A. The 1977 Law
The 1977 law specified a total of eleven possible special circum-
stances that might be alleged to justify imposition of a sentence of death
or life without parole for first-degree murder. 196 The death penalty was
imposed under the 1977 law in a total of twenty-seven of the cases re-
viewed by the Bird court. 19 7 In most of these cases, more than one spe-
cial circumstance was found. Nineteen of the cases included findings
that the murder was committed during the commission of another fel-
ony. 198 Twelve cases included findings that the defendant was convicted
of more than one murder.1 99 One case included a finding that the mur-
196. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (repealed 1978). The 11 special circumstances specified
under the 1977 law were as follows: (1) murder for hire; (2) murder by explosive; (3) murder
or acting in the murder of a peace officer; (4) murder of a witness; (5) murder during the
commission of a robbery; (6) murder during the commission of a kidnapping; (7) murder dur-
ing the commission of rape; (8) murder during the commission of a lewd or lascivious act upon
a child under 14; (9) murder during the commission of a residential burglary; (10) murder
involving torture; (11) murder by a person with a prior conviction of murder.
197. See infra Appendix, Table 5.
198. People v. Phillips, 41 Cal. 3d 29, 711 P.2d 423, 222 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1986) (robbery);
People v. Croy, 41 Cal. 3d 1, 710 P.2d 392, 221 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1986) (robbery); People v.
Frierson, 39 Cal. 3d 803, 705 P.2d 396, 218 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1985) [hereinafter Frierson II]
(kidnapping); People v. Frank, 38 Cal. 3d 711, 700 P.2d 415, 214 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1985) (kid-
napping); People v. Mattson, 37 Cal. 3d 85, 688 P.2d 889, 207 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1984) (rape,
kidnapping, lewd and lascivious acts with child under 14); People v. Lanphear, 36 Cal. 3d 163,
680 P.2d 1081, 203 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1984) [hereinafter Lanphear II] (robbery); People v. Har-
ris, 36 Cal. 3d 36, 679 P.2d 433, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984) (robbery,
burglary); People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 673 P.2d 680, 197 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1983), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984) (robbery); People v. Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d 21, 655 P.2d 279, 188
Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982) (robbery, kidnapping, rape); People v. Stankewitz, 32 Cal. 3d 80, 648 P.2d
578, 184 Cal. Rptr. 611 (1982) (robbery, kidnapping); People v. Harris, 28 Cal. 3d 935, 673
P.2d 240, 171 Cal. Rtpr. 679, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1111 (1981) (robbery, burglary); People v.
Chadd, 28 Cal. 3d 739, 621 P.2d 837, 170 Cal. Rptr. 798, cert. denied, 452 U.S. 931 (1981)
(robbery, rape); People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 (1981) (burglary); People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303, 611 P.2d
883, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1980) (robbery, burglary); People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 609 P.2d
468, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980) (robbery); People v. Lanphear, 26 Cal. 3d 814, 608 P.2d 689, 163
Cal. Rptr. 601, vacated sub nom. California v. Lanphear, 449 U.S. 810 (1980) [hereinafter
Lanphearl] (robbery); People v. Velasquez, 26 Cal. 3d 425, 606 P.2d 341, 162 Cal. Rptr. 306,
vacated sub nom. California v. Velasquez, 448 U.S. 903 (1980) (robbery); People v. Frierson,
25 Cal. 3d 142, 599 P.2d 587, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1979) [hereinafter Frierson I] (robbery,
kidnapping); People v. Teron, 23 Cal. 3d 103, 588 P.2d 773, 151 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1979)
(robbery).
199. People v. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d 658, 666, 700 P.2d 446, 451, 214 Cal. Rptr. 832, 837
(1985); Mattson, 37 Cal. 3d at 88, 688 P.2d at 890, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 279; Harris, 36 Cal. 3d at
42, 680 P.2d at 1083, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 784; People v. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d 858, 864, 671 P.2d
813, 816, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 312 (1983); Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d at 34, 655 P.2d at 284, 188 Cal.
Rptr. at 82; People v. Gzikowski, 32 Cal. 3d 580, 582, 651 P.2d 1145, 1147, 186 Cal. Rptr.
339, 340 (1982); People v. Arcega, 32 Cal. 3d 504, 510, 651 P.2d 338, 339, 186 Cal. Rptr. 94,
95 (1982); People v. Hogan, 31 Cal. 3d 815, 820, 649 P.2d 93, 95, 183 Cal. Rptr. 817, 819
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der involved infliction of torture,2° one included a finding that the mur-
der was done for valuable consideration, 20 1 one included a finding that
the victim was a police officer in the line of duty2 0 2 and four included a
finding that the defendant had a prior murder conviction.20 3
In reviewing these twenty-seven cases on automatic appeal, the Bird
court reversed the conviction of guilt in eleven cases.2°4 Out of the six-
teen cases in which the conviction was affirmed, the court upheld the
finding of special circumstances in all but four cases.205 Two of the four
cases involved procedural errors which were unrelated to the legal defini-
tion of special circumstances. In People v. Teron,2 °6 the court simply
held the 1977 death penalty law could not be retroactively applied to a
murder committed prior to its enactment.20 7 While the underlying con-
viction of murder was affirmed, the finding of special circumstances was
reversed.20 8 In People v. Frierson,20 9 the court reversed the finding of
special circumstances because of defense counsel's refusal to present evi-
dence that the defendant wanted to present.210 The same case had previ-
ously been reversed on the conviction of guilt due to incompetence of
counsel.2 "
The other two cases in which findings of special circumstances were
reversed under the 1977 law involved allegations that the murders were
committed "during the commission," in one case of a robbery and kid-
napping,212 and in the other case of a robbery and burglary.213 In both
cases, the court found the felonies in question were incidental to the mur-
(1982); People v. Haskett, 30 Cal. 3d 841, 847, 640 P.2d 776, 780, 180 Cal. Rptr. 640, 644
(1982); People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 922 (1982); Chadd, 28 Cal. 3d at 744, 621 P.2d at 839, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 800;
People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1035 (1981).
200. Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d at 51, 655 P.2d at 296, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
201. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d at 864, 671 P.2d at 816, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
202. Croy, 41 Cal. 3d at 5-6, 710 P.2d at 393, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
203. Lanphear II, 36 Cal. 3d at 165, 680 P.2d at 1082, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 123; People v.
Mrocsko, 35 Cal. 3d 86, 97, 672 P.2d 835, 840, 197 Cal. Rptr. 52, 57 (1983); LanphearI, 26
Cal. 3d 814, 608 P.2d 689, 163 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1980); Velasquez, 26 Cal. 3d at 428, 606 P.2d at
342, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
204. See infra Appendix, Table 2.
205. Id.
206. 23 Cal. 3d 103, 588 P.2d 773, 151 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1979).
207. Id. at 115-19, 588 P.2d at 780-82, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 640-42.
208. Id. at 108, 588 P.2d at 775, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
209. 39 Cal. 3d 803, 705 P.2d 396, 218 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1985).
210. Id. at 815-18, 705 P.2d at 403-05, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 80-82.
211. Frierson I, 25 Cal. 3d at 157-67, 599 P.2d at 595-601, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 289-95.
212. People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980).
213. People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303, 611 P.2d 883, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1980).
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der, rather than vice-versa.214 As the court construed the requirement
that the murder occur "during the commission" of an enumerated fel-
ony, it would not apply to situations where a robbery is committed
merely to facilitate or conceal a murder.215 The court did not find error
in the instructions to the jury in either case. Rather, based on an insuffi-
ciency of the evidence, it concluded that the special circumstances al-
216leged had not been proven. In numerous subsequent cases under the
1977 law, the Bird court distinguished its holdings in People v. Green217
and People v. Thompson,21 8 upholding findings of special circumstances
that included a murder "during the commission" of robbery, kidnapping,
rape and burglary.
219
The Lucas court has reviewed eleven death penalty judgments im-
posed under the 1977 law,220 reversing one on the underlying conviction
of guilt.221 Of the ten remaining, only one was reversed on the finding of
special circumstances. In People v. Morris,222 the defendant was con-
victed of the shooting murder of a nude man in a bathhouse frequented
by homosexuals. 223 Based on a "robbery-murder" special circumstance,
he was sentenced to death.224 The court concluded there was insufficient
evidence to prove a robbery, and remanded for resentencing.225 In the
course of its ruling, however, the court rejected a claim that the robbery
could not supply a special circumstance since it was time-barred by the
statute of limitations.226 The majority held that the crime relied upon to
supply the special circumstance need not be separately charged.
227 Jus-
tice Broussard dissented, contending this interpretation of the 1977 law
repudiated five precedents decided by the Bird court.2 28
214. Id. at 324, 611 P.2d at 894, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 300; Green, 27 Cal. 3d at 61, 609 P.2d at
505, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
215. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d at 322, 611 P.2d at 893, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 299; Green, 27 Cal. 3d
at 59-62, 609 P.2d at 504-06, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 37-39.
216. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d at 325, 611 P.2d at 895, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 301; Green, 27 Cal. 3d
at 74, 609 P.2d at 514, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
217. 27 Cal. 3d 1, 609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980).
218. 27 Cal. 3d 303, 611 P.2d 883, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1980).
219. See, e.g., Phillips, 41 Cal. 3d at 60, 711 P.2d at 442, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 127; Fields, 35
Cal. 3d at 367, 673 P.2d at 704, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 803; Ramos, 30 Cal. 3d at 586, 639 P.2d at
927, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 285; Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d at 51, 655 P.2d at 296, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
220. See infra Appendix, Table 6.
221. People v. Snow, 44 Cal. 3d 216, 746 P.2d 445, 242 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1988).
222. 46 Cal. 3d 1, 756 P.2d 843, 249 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1988).
223. Id. at 10, 756 P.2d at 847-48, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 123-24.
224. Id. at 9, 756 P.2d at 847, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
225. Id. at 10, 756 P.2d at 847-48, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
226. Id. at 18, 756 P.2d at 853, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 43, 756 P.2d at 870, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
November 1989]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
In People v. Kimble,22 9 the court upheld felony-murder special cir-
cumstance findings for burglary and rape under the 1977 law even
though the jury had not been instructed of the need to find an "independ-
ent felonious purpose" pursuant to People v. Green.230 Justice Mosk dis-
sented, urging that such error should be reversible per se.
B. The Carlos/Garcia Rule and Its Demise
The 1978 death penalty law,232 adopted by initiative in November,
1978,233 substantially expanded the special circumstances available to
permit a sentence of death or life without parole. The new categories
included: (1) murder committed to prevent arrest or perfect an escape
from lawful custody; (2) murder of federal law enforcement officers, fire-
men, prosecutors, judges or elected officials related to the performance of
their duties; (3) murder which was "especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel"; (4) murder committed by lying in wait; (5) murder committed
because of the victim's race, color, religion or nationality; (6) murder
committed by poison.234
The initiative measure also made significant modifications in the cat-
egories of special circumstances previously defined in the 1977 law.23
Most significant were the changes in the "felony-murder" categories.
Under the 1977 law, an intent to kill on the part of the defendant was an
absolute prerequisite to .finding that the murder was committed during
the commission of an enumerated felony.2 36 Section 190.2(c) had re-
quired that "the defendant was personally present during the commission
of the act or acts causing death, and with intent to cause death physically
aided or committed such act or acts causing death. '2 37 Section 190.2(d)
had further provided:
For the purposes of subdivision (c), the defendant shall be
deemed to have physically aided in the act or acts causing death
only if it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct
constitutes an assault or a battery upon the victim or if by word
229. 44 Cal. 3d 480, 749 P.2d 803, 244 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 188
(1989).
230. Id. at 501, 749 P.2d at 816, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
231. Id. at 517, 749 P.2d at 827, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 172-73 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
232. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190-190.5 (West 1988).
233. Initiative Measure, Proposition 14, Nov. 7, 1978.
234. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West 1988).
235. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (repealed 1978) with CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.2(a) (West 1988).
236. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(c) (repealed 1978).
237. Id.
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or conduct he orders, initiates or coerces the actual killing of
the victim.23
Both of these provisions were eliminated by the Briggs Initiative; how-
ever, the new law created some ambiguity concerning whether a defend-
ant participating in a felony had to actually intend to cause the death of
the victim. Section 190.2(a)(17) now requires that "the murder was com-
mitted while the defendant was engaged in or was an accomplice in the
commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after
committing or attempting to commit [an enumerated felony]. 2 39 Sec-
tion 190.2(b), however, imposes a broad requirement of intent on all spe-
cial circumstances with the exception of that for prior conviction of
murder:
Every person whether or not the actual killer found guilty of
intentionally aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, induc-
ing, soliciting, requesting, or assisting any actor in the commis-
sion of murder in the first degree shall suffer death or
confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possi-
bility of parole, in any case in which one or more of the special
circumstances enumerated in paragraph... (17)... of subdivi-
sion (a) of this section has been charged and specially found
under § 190.4 to be true.24
The issue of intent raised by this ambiguity achieved constitutional
stature in Enmund v. Florida,241 in which the United States Supreme
Court held that the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment precludes the imposition of a death penalty without proof
that the defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended or contemplated
that life would be taken.242 The Court noted that only eight jurisdictions
permitted imposition of a death penalty for participation in a robbery in
which another robber takes a life: California, Florida, Georgia, Missis-
sippi, Nevada, South Carolina, Tennessee and Wyoming.243 Four years
later, the United States Supreme Court held, in a five-to-four ruling, that
238. Id. § 190.2(d).
239. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17) (West 1988).
240. Id. § 190.2(b).
241. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
242. Id. at 801.
243. Many of these states responded to Enmund by incorporating a requirement that the
jury be instructed to make a factual finding of intent to kill before a death penalty can be
imposed. In Allen v. State, 253 Ga. 390, 321 S.E.2d 710 (1984), the Georgia Supreme Court
held that where the death penalty is sought in a felony-murder case, the jury must be given the
option of three verdicts: guilty of malice-murder, guilty of felony-murder or not guilty. Id. at
395 n.3, 321 S.E.2d at 715 n.3. The Mississippi Legislature amended that state's death penalty
law to require Enmund findings. 1983 Miss. Laws ch. 429, § 2 (codified at Miss. CODE ANN.
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the Enmund findings can be made by an appellate court, a trial judge or a
jury, and special instructions for a factual determination by the jury are
not constitutionally required.244
The California Supreme Court addressed this problem for the first
time in Carlos v. Superior Court.245 Carlos was not a review of a death
penalty judgment, but rather a pretrial writ challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence presented at a preliminary hearing.2 46 Significantly, the is-
sue was resolved as a question of statutory construction, rather than as a
constitutional question. The court resolved the ambiguity by construing
California Penal Code section 190.2(b) to require a finding of intent to
kill before a defendant is subject to a felony-murder special circumstance
finding under section 190.2(a)(17).247 Strong support for this interpreta-
tion was found in the ballot arguments that accompanied the Briggs Ini-
tiative.248 Voters were given emphatic assurances that one who merely
aided another in committing a murder without intent to kill was not sub-
ject to the death penalty because section 190.2(b) "says that the person
must have intentionally aided in the commission of a murder to be sub-
ject to the death penalty under this initiative.
249
Eight months later, in People v. Garcia,250 the court declared that
Carlos would apply retroactively to all cases not yet final, and that, with
limited exceptions to be noted, Carlos error is reversible per se, with no
additional showing of prejudice required.251 The per se rule was found to
be constitutionally required, because a failure to instruct the jury that
intent to kill must be found deprives the defendant of his constitutional
right that a jury be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt.252
The Carlos/Garcia rulings had greater impact on death penalty ad-
judication in California than any other decisions of the California
Supreme Court. Of the twenty-six cases in which the Bird court upheld
§ 99-19-101(7) (Supp. 1985)). The South Carolina Supreme Court held that during the penalty
phase of a capital case:
the trial judge should charge that the death penalty can not be imposed on an indi-
vidual who aids and abets in a crime in the course of which a murder is committed by
others, but who did not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place
or that lethal force be used.
State v. Peterson, 287 S.C. 244, 248, 335 S.E.2d 800, 802 (1985).
244. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 392 (1986).
245. 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983).
246. Id. at 136, 672 P.2d at 865, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 82.
247. Id. at 141, 672 P.2d at 868, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
248. Id. at 144, 672 P.2d at 871, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
249. Id. (emphasis in original).
250. 36 Cal. 3d 539, 684 P.2d 826, 205 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1984).
251. Id. at 544-45, 684 P.2d at 827, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
252. Id. at 551, 684 P.2d at 832, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
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the conviction of guilt and reviewed the finding of special circumstances
under the Briggs Initiative,253 sixteen (61.5%) resulted in reversal of the
finding of special circumstances, and every one of these reversals was
based at least in part on the Carlos/Garcia rulings." 4
The felony-murder special circumstances are frequently utilized in
death penalty cases under the Briggs Initiative. Of the thirty-seven cases
tried under the Briggs Initiative that were reviewed by the Bird court,255
all but five included an allegation of at least one felony-murder special
circumstance. 6  Of the sixty Briggs cases reviewed by the Lucas
court,257 only fifteen (25%) have not included a felony-murder special
circumstance. The five Bird court cases in which felony-murder special
circumstances were not alleged all resulted in affirmance of the finding of
special circumstances.25
Only four cases in which felony-murder special circumstances were
alleged under the 1978 Briggs Initiative resulted in Bird court affirmance
of the finding of special circumstances.2 59 All came within exceptions to
253. See infra Appendix, Table 2, Table 5.
254. Id.
255. See infra Appendix, Table 5.
256. People v. Bloyd, 43 Cal. 3d 333, 362, 729 P.2d 802, 820, 233 Cal. Rptr. 368, 385 (1987)
(multiple murder); People v. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d 1222, 1236, 729 P.2d 115, 120, 232 Cal. Rptr.
849, 854 (1986) (multiple murder, witness killing, prior murder); People v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal.
3d 730, 742, 726 P.2d 113, 119, 230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 673 (1986) (killing of police officer); People
v. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d 353, 357, 710 P.2d 925, 927, 222 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (1985) (multiple
murder); People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247, 260, 710 P.2d 861, 869, 221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 801
(1985) (torture murder).
257. See infra Appendix, Table 3, Table 6.
258. Bloyd, 43 Cal. 3d at 340, 729 P.2d at 804, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 370 (multiple murder);
Allen, 42 Cal. 3d at 1236, 729 P.2d at 120, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 854 (multiple murder, witness
killing, prior murder); Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d at 742, 726 P.2d at 119, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 673
(killing of police officer); Deere, 41 Cal. 3d at 356, 710 P.2d at 927, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 15
(multiple murder); Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d at 255, 710 P.2d at 864, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 797 (tor-
ture murder).
259. In People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 709 P.2d 440, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1985), rev'd in
part sub nom. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987) the jury made a special finding that the
murder was premeditated, thus precluding any attack on the finding of a rape-murder special
circumstance under Carlos/Garcia. In People v. Montiel, 39 Cal. 3d 910, 705 P.2d 1248, 218
Cal. Rptr. 572 (1985), the jury made a finding that the murder was intentional in the course of
finding another special circumstance was true, that the murder "was intentional and carried
out for financial gain." Even though the financial gain special circumstance was set aside, the
court held the intent finding could be utilized to sustain the felony-murder "special circum-
stance." Id. at 926, 705 P.2d at 1257, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 581. In People v. Walker, 41 Cal. 3d
116, 711 P.2d 465, 222 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1985) (opinion in official reporter depublished after a
grant of a rehearing), the court found two exceptions to Carlos/Garcia applicable. First, the
issue of intent was necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant under other instructions.
The defendant was charged with assault with intent to kill two other victims shot at the same
time as the murder victim, and the court found it "inconceivable the jury would find that
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the Carlos/Garcia rulings.26 0 While most Bird court reversals of special
circumstances findings pursuant to the Carlos/Garcia rule were in cases
where felony-murder special circumstances were alleged pursuant to sec-
tion 190.2(a)(17), the Carlos/Garcia rule raised troublesome issues with
respect to other definitions of special circumstances as well.
The "intent" requirement of section 190.2(b) includes each of the
nineteen enumerated special circumstance definitions except subsection
(a)(2), prior conviction of murder.26 1 This creates an anomaly because
some of the enumerated definitions include a specific requirement of in-
tent, while others do not. The multiple-murder special circumstance of
subsection (a)(3), for example, simply requires that the defendant "has in
this proceeding been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the
first or second degree."262 In People v. Turner,263 the court reversed a
special circumstance finding of multiple murder as well as two felony-
murder special circumstance findings, holding that Carlos interpreted
section 190.2(b) to apply to the actual killer as well as to an accomplice,
and by its terms it applied to the multiple-murder special circumstance as
well as the felony-murder special circumstance.2 Thus, the intent in-
struction required by Carlos had to be given under all of the special cir-
cumstances enumerated in section 190.2(a) except (a)(2).
The continuing viability of the Carlos/Garcia rule was one of the
first issues tackled by the Lucas court.265 Meanwhile, the United States
Supreme Court had seriously undercut the Enmund ruling by its decision
in Tison v. Arizona.266 In Tison, two sons helped their father escape from
prison and supplied him weapons used to murder a family of four in
defendant intended to kill only the victims who survived, but not the one who died." Id., 765
P.2d at 482, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 879. Second, an exception applies "where the parties recognized
that intent to kill was in issue, presented all evidence at their command on that issue, and...
the record not only establishes the necessary intent as a matter of law but shows the contrary
evidence not worthy of consideration." Id., 711 P.2d at 474, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 178-79. The
court assumed that all evidence available on intent was presented because it was an explicit
element in issue, but suggested that the defendant could pursue a writ of habeas corpus if he
"can demonstrate that this assumption is inaccurate." Id., 711 P.2d at 475-76, 222 Cal. Rptr.
at 180. In People v. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d 505, 511, 714 P.2d 1251, 1254, 224 Cal. Rptr. 112,
115 (1986), the jury made an express finding of intent to kill. In People v. Myers, 43 Cal. 3d
250, 255, 729 P.2d 698, 699, 233 Cal. Rptr. 264, 265 (1987), a robbery-murder special-circum-
stance finding was not challenged on appeal.
260. See supra note 259.
261. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(b) (West 1988).
262. Id. § 190.2(a)(3).
263. 37 Cal. 3d 302, 690 P.2d 669, 208 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1984).
264. Id. at 329, 690 P.2d at 686, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
265. See People v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1325, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987).
266. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
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order to steal the family's car.z67 Although the court remanded to the
state court to determine the defendants' mental state, the Court recog-
nized that the death penalty could be imposed on the sons even though
they did not intend the killings or directly participate in them, since their
conduct established "reckless indifference to human life."'268 In recon-
ciling this ruling with Enmund, the Court distinguished Enmund as a
case of "felony murder simpliciter," while Tison involved a "midrange"
case of aggravated felony-murder. 69 Most significant, however, was the
Court's categorization of the approaches taken by the various states to
the issue. California's position was characterized as a misinterpretation
of Enmund:
The dissent objects to our classification of California among the
States whose statutes authorize capital punishment for felony
murder simpliciter on the ground that the California Supreme
Court in Carlos v. Superior Court construed its capital murder
statute to require a finding of intent to kill. But the California
Supreme Court only did so in light of perceived federal consti-
tutional limitations stemming from our then recent decision in
Enmund.zT°
To the newly constituted California Supreme Court, that could only be
read as an open invitation to reconsider the Carlos ruling.
In People v. Anderson, 7' the California Supreme Court directly
overruled Carlos, announcing a new interpretation of section 190.2(b)
and section 190.2(a)(17): "intent to kill is not an element of the felony-
murder special circumstance; but when the defendant is an aider and
abetter rather than the actual killer, intent must be proved before the
trier of fact can find the special circumstance to be true. '272 The same
interpretation was also extended to the multiple murder special circum-
stance,273 overruling People v. Turner.74 While the decision surprised no
one, the identity of the author did: Justice Stanley Mosk, who had con-
curred in the original Carlos decision. Justice Mosk relied heavily on the
decisions of the supreme court limiting Enmund:
First, Bullock and Tison have compelled us to dismiss, as a
matter of federal constitutional law, the concerns that our un-
267. Id. at 141.
268. Id. at 158.
269. Id. at 155.
270. Id. at 153 n.8 (citations omitted).
271. 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1325, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987).
272. Id. at 1138-39, 742 P.2d at 1344-45, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 604-05.
273. Id. at 1148-49, 742 P.2d at 1351-52, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 611-12.
274. 37 Cal. 3d 302, 690 P.2d 669, 208 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1984).
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derstanding of the reasoning of Enmund had engendered. Sec-
ond, we are no longer of the opinion that the reading of section
190.2(a)(17) that we adopt today raises grave and doubtful con-
stitutional questions under the Eighth Amendment and the
equal protection clause .... 275
Justice Broussard dissented, claiming little had changed except the
composition of the court. He dismissed both Cabana and Tison as hav-
ing little effect on the reasoning of Carlos: "It is disingenuous to claim
that a passing remark in Cabana v. Bullock and a mistaken footnote in
Tison v. Arizona justify reconsideration of that decision. '2 76 Noting that
intent-to-kill instructions were being routinely given in the cases tried
after Carlos was filed, he concluded:
Indeed, the only reason Carlos is an issue today is that this
court has failed to decide a number of cases that were tried
prior to December of 1983 in which an intent-to-kill instruction
was not given. Some of those cases, including the present one,
will have to be retried anyway, but in others Carlos stood as a
possible barrier to the execution of that minority of murder de-
fendants unlucky enough to have their cases still pending
before this court in January of 1987. The majority tear down
that barrier, heedless of the effect of their decision upon cases
not yet tried.277
The tearing down of the Carlos barrier certainly broke the logjam.
After the decision in Anderson, the affirmance of special circumstance
findings became quite routine. The vast majority of affirmances have
been unanimous. On occasion, the Lucas court has reversed some multi-
ple findings of special circumstances, 278 but none of the sixty Briggs Initi-
ative cases decided by the Lucas court thus far have resulted in a reversal
of the judgment because of an erroneous finding of special circumstances.
Even in post-Anderson cases in which the defendant was an accom-
plice, the court has used a harmless error analysis to uphold a finding of
special circumstance although the jury was not instructed on the need to
find intent to kill. For example, in People v. Garrison,279 Justice Panelli
concluded that a failure to instruct the jury of the need to find intent to
275. 43 Cal. 3d at 1146, 742 P.2d at 1331, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
276. Id. at 1156, 742 P.2d at 1338, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 617 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
277. Id. at 1165, 742 P.2d at 1344, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 623 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
278. See, e.g., People v. Bonin, 47 Cal. 3d 808, 765 P.2d 460, 254 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1988);
People v. Garrison, 47 Cal. 3d 746, 765 P.2d 419, 254 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1988); People v. Silva, 45
Cal. 3d 604, 754 P.2d 1070, 247 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1988); People v. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d 975, 750
P.2d 794, 244 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1987).
279. 47 Cal. 3d 746, 765 P.2d 419, 254 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988).
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kill was harmless because the finding could be implied from the simulta-
neous finding of intentional killing of a witness.28° Justices Broussard
and Mosk both dissented, protesting that faulty instructions on aiding
and abetting the witness killing did not foreclose the possibility that a
finding of intent was never made.
2 81
C. Other Special Circumstances Under the Briggs Initiative
Apart from the ambiguity as to "intent to kill,"2 2 many other defi-
nitions of special circumstances under the 1978 Briggs Initiative2 83 cre-
ated additional problems of interpretation for the Bird court. The special
circumstance defined in California Penal Code section 190.2(a)(14),2" 4
that the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting
exceptional depravity," was declared unconstitutionally vague by a five-
to-one vote of the court in People v. Superior Court (Engert).285 Engert
was premised on both state constitutional grounds as well as federal
grounds.286 Similar provisions in other states have met with mixed suc-
cess. The supreme courts of Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Idaho and
Wyoming have rejected the reasoning of Engert,287 while Delaware has
agreed.288
In striking down the special circumstance for "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel" murders in Engert, the court noted the possible over-
lap with the special circumstance defined in section 190.2(a)(18),289
where the murder "involved the infliction of torture," further defined as
"the infliction of extreme pain no matter how long its duration." 290 In
People v. Davenport,291 the court affirmed a finding of special circum-
stances based on a torture allegation under the 1978 Briggs Initiative.292
The 1977 death penalty law also provided for the finding of special cir-
cumstance in cases of torture, and explicitly required that the defendant
280. Id. at 789-90, 765 P.2d at 442-43, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 280-81.
281. Id. at 797, 765 P.2d at 447, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 285 (Broussard & Mosk, JJ., dissenting).
282. See supra notes 235-49 and accompanying text.
283. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1988).
284. Id. § 190.2(a)(14).
285. 31 Cal. 3d 797, 800-01, 647 P.2d 76, 77, 183 Cal. Rptr. 800, 801 (1982).
286. Id.
287. See Arango v. State, 411 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1982); Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 66, 295 S.E.
2d 727 (1982); Billiot v. State, 454 So. 2d 446 (Miss. 1984); Creech v. State, 105 Idaho 362, 670
P.2d 463 (1988); Hopkinson v. State, 704 P.2d 1323 (Wyo. 1985).
288. See Chaplin v. State, 433 A.2d 327 (Del. 1981).
289. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(18) (West 1988).
290. Engert, 31 Cal. 3d at 802 n.2, 647 P.2d at 78 n.2, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 802 n.2.
291. 41 Cal. 3d 247, 710 P.2d 861, 221 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1985).
292. Id. at 273-75, 710 P.2d at 876-78, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 809-11.
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have possessed the intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain.29 3 The
Briggs Initiative omitted any reference to intent, focusing on the victim's
experience of pain.294 The court in Davenport found this focus ambigu-
ous because the victim's experience would be difficult to prove, and to
distinguish murders on such a basis would raise a significant constitu-
tional issue of equal protection of the law.295 Thus, it incorporated prior
judicial construction of the term "torture" to require an intent to torture
the victim.2 96 Since the trial court had instructed the jury that both an
intent to kill and the intentional infliction of extreme physical pain must
be proven to establish the torture "special circumstance," the finding was
upheld by the court.2 9 7
The viability of Engert was thrown into doubt in a dissenting opin-
ion that then Associate Justice Lucas attached to one of the final death
penalty decisions of the Bird court, handed down on January 2, 1987. In
People v. Wade,29 8 Justice Lucas, joined by Justice Panelli, dissented to
the reversal of a "heinous and cruel" special circumstance in a child'
abuse murder case. 299 A rehearing was granted after the new justices
were appointed °.3 ° However, after rehearing, both justices apparently
thought better of Engert, and joined in following Engert to reverse the
"heinous and cruel" special circumstance.3 0 ' At the same time, however,
the court upheld a torture special circumstance despite the trial court's
failure to explicitly instruct the jury in accordance with Davenport. °2 In
People v. Silva,30 3 the Attorney General's suggestion that Engert be reex-
amined was rejected "in this case.
' '
131
Two more special circumstance definitions under the 1978 Briggs
Initiative were examined by the Bird court in People v. Bigelow.3°5 First,
293. Id. at 260-62, 710 P.2d at 868-70, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 801-02.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 270, 710 P.2d at 875, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
296. Id. at 266-71, 710 P.2d at 872-75, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 805-08.
297. Id. at 271-72, 710 P.2d at 876, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
298. 233 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1987) [hereinafter Wade 1]. The opinion was depublished upon
grant of rehearing and therefore does not appear in the official reporter. The decision after
rehearing appears at 44 Cal. 3d 975, 750 P.2d 794, 244 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1987) [hereinafter
Wade II].
299. Wade I, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 60 (Lucas & Panelli, JJ., dissenting).
300. Wade II, 44 Cal. 3d at 975, 750 P.2d at 794, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
301. Id. at 993, 750 P.2d at 804, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
302. Id. at 993-94, 750 P.2d at 804-05, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 915-16; see supra notes 286-92 for
a discussion of Davenport.
303. 45 Cal. 3d 604, 754 P.2d 1070, 247 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 820
(1989).
304. Id. at 631, 754 P.2d at 1084, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
305. 37 Cal. 3d 731, 750-52, 691 P.2d 994, 1005-06, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328, 339-41 (1984).
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a finding that the murder was carried out for financial gain was reversed
because the trial court construed it too broadly.3" 6 Noting that the spe-
cial circumstance defined in section 190.2(a)(1) "replaced the precise lan-
guage of the 1977 act with vague and broad generalities," the court
adopted a limiting construction requiring that the victim's death be an
essential prerequisite to the financial gain sought by the defendant. Sec-
ond, a finding that the murder was committed "for the purpose of avoid-
ing or preventing a lawful arrest or to perfect, or attempt to perfect an
escape from lawful custody," was also reversed because of the broad in-
terpretation given by the trial court.30 7 The court held that the special
circumstance of avoiding arrest must be limited to cases in which arrest
is imminent, and the special circumstance of perfecting escape must be
limited to situations before the defendant has departed the confines of a
prison facility and reached a place of temporary safety outside the con-
fines of the prison. In construing the financial gain, avoiding arrest,
and perfecting escape special circumstances, the court was concerned
that broad construction of these provisions would result in substantial
overlap with felony-murder special circumstances. The court stated:
"We believe the court should construe special circumstance provisions to
minimize those cases in which multiple circumstances will apply to the
same conduct, thereby reducing the risk that multiple findings on special
circumstances will prejudice the defendant.
3 9
Bigelow was significantly limited by the Lucas court in People v.
Howard.310 Seizing on the rationale offered in Bigelow that overlap with
other special circumstances should be avoided, the court held that the
Bigelow definition of "financial gain" need only be given when alternative
special circumstances are also alleged.31' Justice Broussard concurred,
suggesting that although the error was harmless in this case, the financial
gain special circumstance should not be given varying meanings depend-
ing on the charges filed.312  Howard was followed in People v.
Edelbacher,313 where the jury instructions included no definition of "fi-
306. Id.
307. Id. at 741, 751-54, 691 P.2d at 999, 1005-07, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 333, 338-42.
308. Id. at 754, 691 P.2d at 1007, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
309. Id. at 751, 691 P.2d at 1003, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
310. 44 Cal. 3d 375, 409-10, 749 P.2d 279, 298, 243 Cal. Rptr. 842, 861, cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 188 (1988).
311. Id. at 410, 749 P.2d at 298, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
312. Id. at 447, 749 P.2d at 324, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (Broussard, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
313. 47 Cal. 3d 983, 766 P.2d 1, 254 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1988).
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nancial gain."314 However, in People v. Silva,315 the Lucas court reversed
a finding of the financial gain special circumstance, citing Bigelow.3" 6
Chief Justice Lucas politely declined the invitation of the Attorney Gen-
eral to reconsider the Bigelow decision.31 7
The final special circumstance that presented a construction prob-
lem under the Briggs Initiative was section 190.2(a)(10), dealing with
murders committed for the purpose of preventing a victim from testify-
ing in a criminal proceeding. 31 8 In People v. Weidert,31 9 the Bird court
held that this provision could not be applied to a defendant who killed
the victim to prevent his testifying in a juvenile delinquency proceed-
ing.32° The court relied upon the long-standing distinction between
criminal and juvenile proceedings embodied in Welfare and Institutions
Code section 203: "An order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the
juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction for any purpose, nor shall
a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal proceeding."
3 2 1
The Lucas court has had no occasion to reconsider Weidert, but
legislation is pending to amend section 190.2(a)(10) to include juvenile
proceedings.322
D. Summary of Special Circumstances Cases
The remarkable divergence of results between the Bird court and the
Lucas court in reviewing findings of special circumstances is largely at-
tributable to the Lucas court's early decision to directly overrule Carlos
v. Superior Court.323 However, other Bird court precedents have been
given constrictive interpretations, and harmless error has been liberally
applied.324 Finally, the Lucas court has frequently reversed certain spe-
cial circumstance findings while upholding others in the same case.325
314. Id. at 1025, 766 P.2d at 26, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 611-12.
315. 45 Cal. 3d 604, 754 P.2d 1070, 247 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1988).
316. Id. at 630, 754 P.2d at 1084, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 587 (citing People v. Bigelow, 37 Cal. 3d
731, 751, 691 P.2d 994, 1006, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328, 340 (1984)).
317. Id.
318. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(10) (West 1988).
319. 39 Cal. 3d 836, 705 P.2d 380, 218 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1985).
320. Id. at 854, 705 P.2d at 391, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
321. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 203 (West 1988) (construed in People v. Weidert, 39 Cal.
3d 836, 844, 705 P.2d 380, 384, 218 Cal. Rptr. 57, 61 (1985)).
322. S.B. 2, which includes juvenile proceedings, was approved by the Senate and for-
warded to the Assembly. L.A. Daily J., May 30, 1989, at 5.
323. See People v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1325, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987).
324. See, e.g., People v. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d 375, 749 P.2d 279, 243 Cal. Rptr. 842, cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 188 (1988); People v. Bigelow, 37 Cal. 3d 731, 691 P.2d 994, 209 Cal. Rptr.
328 (1984).
325. People v. Bonin, 47 Cal. 3d 808, 851, 765 P.2d 460, 485, 254 Cal. Rptr. 298, 323
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Invariably, the Lucas court assumes that the submission of invalid spe-
cial circumstances to the jury was "harmless error," and undertakes little
or no analysis to support its conclusion.326 In one case decided by the
Bird court, People v. Allen,327 a death penalty was upheld even though
eight out of eleven special circumstances were set aside.328 That case was
cited by Chief Justice Lucas to uphold the death verdict in People v.
Silva.329 In Allen, the same evidence supported both the special circum-
stance findings that were upheld as well as those that were invalidated.33 °
In Silva, it did not.
3 31
Special circumstances review has been given routine treatment in
the Lucas court, and the members of the court have ceased dissenting.
As a result, the function originally envisaged for special circumstance
findings, to provide a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases
in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it
is not, 313 2 is disappearing from the law. This reflects a significant differ-
ence in how the Bird court and the Lucas court perceive their roles. The
Bird court obviously desired that its decisions impact prosecutors by en-
couraging them to use the death penalty law cautiously and selectively.
Strict interpretations of the special circumstance requirement accom-
plished this goal. As Table 4 indicates, new death penalty judgments
declined every year from 1981 to 1985. 33 The Lucas court has rejected a
supervisory role, and the number of new death judgments is spiraling
upwards.
As the Davies analysis indicates, the limited conception of a supervi-
sory role is consistent with functioning as an intermediate appellate
court:
The norms of affirmance have direct implications for the nature
and intensity of the Court of Appeal's "supervision" of the
criminal trial courts. The justices of the Court of Appeal do
(1989); People v. Hernandez, 47 Cal. 3d 315, 357, 763 P.2d 1289, 1314, 253 Cal. Rptr. 199,
233 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3201 (1989).
326. Bonin, 47 Cal. 3d at 854, 765 P.2d at 487, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 325; Hernandez, 47 Cal. 3d
at 357, 763 P.2d at 1314, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 223-24.
327. 42 Cal. 3d 1222, 729 P.2d 115, 232 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 202
(1987).
328. Id. at 1288, 729 P.2d at 157, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
329. 45 Cal. 3d 604, 632, 754 P.2d 1070, 1085, 247 Cal. Rptr. 573, 588 (1988) (citing People
v. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d 1222, 729 P.2d 115, 232 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1986)).
330. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d at 1274, 729 P.2d at 147, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
331. Silva, 45 Cal. 3d at 633, 754 P.2d at 1085-86, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
332. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
313 (1972).
333. See infra Appendix, Table 4.
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recognize that their ability to reverse provides them with a
powerful sanction that can be used to supervise.... However,
the justices said that they do not allow this supervisory poten-
tial to override the norms of affirmance. With near unanimity
they rejected the notion that it might be appropriate to reverse
a case simply to sanction a trial judge, prosecutor, or police
officer for misconduct. Instead, they assigned higher priority to
norms of affirmance like the harmless error rule than to super-
visory concerns.334
V. THE DETERMINATION OF PENALTY
Under both the 1977 death penalty law335 and the 1978 Briggs Initi-
ative,336 once a defendant has been convicted and an allegation of special
circumstances found true, a separate hearing for the determination of
penalty is mandated.33 7 That hearing ordinarily takes place before the
same jury that convicted the defendant and found the special circum-
stances to be true.338 Even if the defendant waived a jury trial on the
issue of guilt or special circumstances, or pled guilty, he is entitled to a
jury determination of the penalty.339 The jury must choose between the
penalties of death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole, and
must agree unanimously as to that choice.34' Evidence of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances is admitted, and the jury is instructed as to
the exercise of its discretion.341
In reviewing the determination of penalty, the California Supreme
Court may be called upon to decide a variety of issues, including the
procedure by which the jury was selected, the admissibility of evidence,
the competence of counsel, and the propriety of instructions to the
jury.342 From the restoration of the death penalty in California on Au-
gust 11, 1977, to the departure of Chief Justice Bird and Justices Grodin
and Reynoso in January 1987, the supreme court reviewed the penalty
determination in twenty-two cases in which a conviction of guilt and
finding of special circumstances were affirmed.343 In one additional case,
334. Davies, supra note 3, at 608-09.
335. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190-190.9 (repealed 1978).
336. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190-190.9 (West 1988).
337. Id. § 190.3.
338. Id.
339. Id. § 190.4(b).
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. § 190.4.
343. See infra Appendix, Table 5.
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People v. Ramos,'" the court reviewed the penalty determination even
though the finding of special circumstances was reversed.345 Of these
twenty-three cases, the penalty determination was reversed in eight-
een. 46 Three of the affirmances were in cases under the 1977 death pen-
alty law. 47 Thus, the Bird court affirmed only two death penalties
imposed under the Briggs Initiative.
From the swearing-in of the new justices in March 1987, through
March 1989, the Lucas court reviewed the penalty determination in
sixty-six cases where a conviction and finding of special circumstances
were affirmed.3 48 Fifteen have resulted in reversal,34 9 one under the 1977
law350 and fourteen under the Briggs Initiative. Half of the Briggs rever-
sals were for giving the instructions on the governor's commutation
power mandated by the Initiative.351
A. The 1977 Law
The determination of penalty was reviewed by the Bird court in a
total of twelve cases under the 1977 death penalty law.352 In three cases,
the imposition of the death penalty was affirmed.353 Of the nine cases in
which the determination of penalty was reversed, five were for proce-
dural errors 354 and four were for improper jury instructions.3 55
344. 30 Cal. 3d 553, 639 P.2d 908, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1982), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1119
(1985).
345. Id. at 591, 602, 639 P.2d at 930, 936, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 288, 294.
346. See infra Appendix, Table 2.
347. See infra Appendix, Table 5.
348. See infra Appendix, Table 3, Table 6.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.; see infra notes 405-11 and accompanying text.
352. See infra Appendix, Table 2, Table 5.
353. People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 673 P.2d 680, 197 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1983), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 892 (1984); People v. Harris, 28 Cal. 3d 935, 623 P.2d 240, 171 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1111 (1982); People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 603 (1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 1035 (1981). All three cases were affirmed by a closely
divided court (four to three in Jackson and four to two in Harris and Fields), and all three
cases are still pending in the courts. Harris is seeking a writ of habeas corpus in the federal
courts, while Jackson and Fields have petitions for writ pending in California courts.
354. People v. Phillips, 41 Cal. 3d 29, 711 P.2d 423, 222 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1985); People v.
Frank, 38 Cal. 3d 711, 700 P.2d 415, 214 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1985); People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal.
3d 733, 631 P.2d 466, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922 (1982); People v.
Lanphear, 26 Cal. 3d 814, 847, 608 P.2d 689, 705, 163 Cal. Rptr. 601, 619, vacated sub nom.
California v. Lanphear, 449 U.S. 810 (1980) [hereinafter Lanphear 1]; People v. Velasquez, 26
Cal. 3d 425, 443-45, 606 P.2d 341, 351-53, 162 Cal. Rptr. 306, 316-18, vacated sub nom. Cali-
fornia v. Velasquez, 448 U.S. 903 (1980).
355. People v. Lanphear, 36 Cal. 3d 163, 680 P.2d 1081, 203 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1984) [herein-
after Lanphear 11]; People v. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d 858, 671 P.2d 813, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1983);
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Two of the cases reversed for procedural errors were reversed due to
Witherspoon error.356 In Witherspoon v. Illinois,3 7 the United States
Supreme Court established standards for the exclusion of jurors who
have conscientious scruples regarding imposition of the death penalty.
35 8
While such scruples were expressed by jurors in both of the reversed
cases, 35 9 the jurors never indicated they would automatically vote against
the death penalty under all circumstances. Relying on specific language
from Witherspoon, the California Supreme Court held that in both cases
it was error to excuse the jurors.36°
The United States Supreme Court again addressed the standard for
exclusion of jurors with death-penalty scruples in Adams v. Texas,36'
holding that a juror could be excluded if his views about capital punish-
ment "would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his du-
ties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. ' 362 On
petitions for certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated the
convictions reversed by the California Supreme Court, and remanded the
cases for "further consideration in light of Adams v. Texas. '363 On re-
mand, the California Supreme Court again reversed the lower court, rely-
ing squarely on Witherspoon, to hold that Adams "does not alter this
conclusion."' 3 " In 1985, the United States Supreme Court in Wainwright
People v. Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d 21, 655 P.2d 279, 188 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982); People v. Haskett,
30 Cal. 3d 841, 640 P.2d 776, 180 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1982).
356. Lanphear I, 26 Cal. 3d at 847, 608 P.2d at 705, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 619; Velasquez, 26
Cal. 3d at 443-45, 606 P.2d at 351-53, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 316-18.
357. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
358. Id. at 522-23, n.21. The Witherspoon Court stated:
If the State had excluded only those prospective jurors who stated in advance of trial
that they would not even consider returning a verdict of death, it could argue that the
resulting jury was simply "neutral" with respect to penalty. But when it swept from
the jury all who expressed conscientious or religious scruples against capital punish-
ment and all who opposed it in principle, the State crossed the line of neutrality.
Id. at 520 (citation omitted).
359. Lanphear, 26 Cal. 3d at 837-40, 608 P.2d at 701-03, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 613-15; Velas-
quez, 26 Cal. 3d at 437-38, 606 P.2d at 347-48, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 312-13.
360. Lanphear I, 26 Cal. 3d at 821, 608 P.2d at 691-92, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 603-04 (citing
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522-23 n.21 (1968)); Velasquez, 26 Cal. 3d at 429, 606
P.2d at 343, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 308 (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522-23 n.21
(1968)). Footnote 21 in Witherspoon declared that jurors could be excluded if they "made
unmistakably clear ... that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital
punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case
before them . . ." Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522-23 n.21 (emphasis added).
361. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
362. Id. at 45.
363. California v. Lanphear, 449 U.S. 810 (1980); California v. Velasquez, 448 U.S. 903
(1980).
364. People v. Lanphear, 28 Cal. 3d 463, 464, 622 P.2d 950, 952, 171 Cal. Rptr. 505, 507
(1980) (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522-23 n.21 (1968)); People v. Velasquez,
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v. Witt' 6 finally clarified the conflict between the Witherspoon and Ad-
ams standards by explicitly rejecting footnote twenty-one of Witherspoon
as dicta.366 The Witt Court concluded:
We therefore take this opportunity to clarify our decision in
Witherspoon, and to reaffirm the above-quoted standard from
Adams as the proper standard.... We note that, in addition to
dispensing with Witherspoon's reference to "automatic" deci-
sion making, this standard likewise does not require that a ju-
ror's bias be proved with "unmistakable clarity." '367
The new standard approved in Witt would probably not require reversal
of cases like Velasquez or Lanphear if they were to recur today. How-
ever, this is not to suggest that either Velasquez or Lanphear was wrongly
decided. As Justice Rehnquist conceded in his majority opinion in Witt,
the confused state of the case law left trial courts a difficult task, "obvi-
ously made more difficult by the fact that the standard applied in Adams
differs markedly from the langiuage of footnote 21 . . . given Wither-
spoon's facts a court applying the general principles of Adams could have
arrived at the 'automatically' language of Witherspoon's footnote 21. "368
Another three reversals of penalty determinations were based on the
erroneous admission of prejudicial evidence. 369 Also, a reversal for erro-
28 Cal. 3d 461, 462, 622 P.2d 952, 953, 171 Cal. Rptr. 507, 508 (1980) (citing Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522-23 n.21 (1968)).
365. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
366. Id. at 424.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 421.
369. In People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 631 P.2d 466, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 922 (1982), the evidence was a prediction by a psychopharmacologist that the
defendant would continue to be violent in a prison setting. The court found such predictions
too unreliable to be admissable as evidence in a death penalty determination. Id. at 767-75,
631 P.2d at 500-08, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 758-63. The admission of similar predictions was held
not to violate the due process clause of the federal Constitution by the United States Supreme
Court in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
It might be suggested that enactment of Proposition 8 in June 1982, see CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 352 (West 1988), would require California courts to follow Barefoot v. Estelle and admit such
evidence. Such a course would be dangerous. Murtishaw is premised on the conclusion that
the prejudicial impact of the evidence outweighed its probative value. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d at
773, 631 P.2d at 471, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 762. Such determinations are unaffected by Proposition
8. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 352. In People v. Frank, 38 Cal. 3d 711, 700 P.2d 415, 214 Cal.
Rptr. 801 (1985), the erroneously admitted evidence consisted of notebooks which were ille-
gally seized from the defendant. Id. at 729, 700 P.2d at 424, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 810. Although
the court concluded their admission was harmless error in the guilt phase, their "dramatically
greater" role in the penalty phase required reversal of the penalty determination. Id. at 735,
700 P.2d at 428, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 814. In People v. Phillips, 41 Cal. 3d 29, 711 P.2d 423, 222
Cal. Rptr. 127 (1985), the court held that the admission of evidence regarding the defendant's
discussion with another of proposed criminal activity was reversible error since evidence of
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neous jury instructions came in People v. Haskett,3 70 where the trial judge
had instructed the jury that the governor could commute a sentence of
life without possibility of parole. 71 Since Haskett arose under the 1977
law, however, the instruction was not mandated in that case.372 Holding
that it was error to give the instruction, the California Supreme Court
principally relied on its precedent in People v. Morse.373
Two other reversals of penalty determinations under the 1977 law
were attributable to errors in instructions to the jury. People v. Easley
374
involved one of the standard "boilerplate" instructions routinely given in
criminal cases, California Jury Instruction Number 1.00: "As jurors,
you must not be influenced by pity for a defendant or by prejudice
against him. You must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture,
sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling."'37' The
court held that it was error to give this instruction at the penalty phase of
a capital case, even though it might be appropriate at the guilt phase.
3 76
Actually, Easley followed an earlier precedent of the court dating back to
1970.177 The court concluded the instruction could have the effect of
telling the jury not to give weight to mitigating evidence presented by the
defendant.37' The court relied on Easley when it reversed the penalty
determination in People v. Lanphear.
379
The United States Supreme Court reviewed the issue after the Bird
court reversed a Briggs case on the same ground. In California v.
Brown,310 in a five-to-four opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court
other "criminal activity" in the penalty phase must relate to an actual completed crime. Id. at
83, 711 P.2d at 459, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
370. 30 Cal. 3d 841, 640 P.2d 776, 180 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1982).
371. Id. at 861-63, 640 P.2d at 788-90, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 652-53.
372. Such an instruction was mandated by the 1978 Briggs Initiative, and will be discussed
in greater detail in the treatment of cases decided under the 1978 Initiative. See infra notes
393-411 and accompanying text.
373. Haskett, 30 Cal. 3d at 861-63, 646 P.2d at 788-90, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 652-54 (citing
People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 649-53, 388 P.2d 33, 51-55, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 212-15 (1964)).
374. 34 Cal. 3d 858, 671 P.2d 813, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1983).
375, Id. at 875, 671 P.2d at 823, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 319 (construing CAL. JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS No. 1.00 (1979)).
376. Id. at 875, 671 P.2d at 823, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
377. Id. (citing People v. Bandhauer, 1 Cal. 3d 609, 618, 463 P.2d 408, 416, 83 Cal. Rptr.
184, 192 (1970)).
378. Id. The courts of other states have generally rejected the Easley ruling, permitting "no
sympathy" instructions.
379. 36 Cal. 3d at 165-66, 680 P.2d at 1082-83, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 123-24. Lanphear was
reversed the first time because of Witherspoon error. Id. at 165, 680 P.2d at 1082, 203 Cal.
Rptr. at 123.
380. 479 U.S. 538 (1987), rev'g People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d. 512, 709 P.2d 440, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 637 (1985).
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held that the "no sympathy" instruction did not violate federal due pro-
cess guarantees.38' The Court chided the California justices for reading
the instruction in a hypertechnical way, focusing just on the word "sym-
pathy. ' 38" The Chief Justice expressed confidence that the typical juror
would understand the instruction as a simple admonition to limit their
consideration to factors shown by the evidence.383
Thus, none of the nine Bird court reversals of penalty determina-
tions under the 1977 death penalty law were due to flaws in the drafting
of the legislation. At least six of the reversals could be directly traced to
clear precedents decided long before the 1977 law was enacted.38 ' While
at least one of those precedents has since been repudiated by the United
States Supreme Court,3 85 only the United States Supreme Court is in a
position to repudiate its own precedents.
The Lucas court reversed only one of the nine death judgments in
which the penalty determination was reviewed under the 1977 law.38 6
That case involved a second death penalty imposed upon Elbert Easley
on remand after the first death penalty was reversed.38 7 Finding that a
conflict of interest was presented by defense counsel's simultaneous rep-
resentation of Easley and a prosecution witness at his penalty trial, the
court concluded that the conflict had an adverse effect on counsel's per-
formance because cross-examination of the witness was hampered.388
An error in another penalty hearing under the 1977 law was found
harmless in People v. Kimble.389 There, the prosecutor argued that the
aggravating circumstance of "violent criminal activity" under section
190.3(b) of the 1977 law could be based on the underlying crime of which
the defendant had just been convicted.39° Although the law clearly lim-
ited this circumstance to other violent criminal activity, the court held
that the error was harmless since the evidence was appropriate to con-
sider under factor 190.3(a).391 In dissenting, Justice Broussard suggested
this "artificial inflation" was compounded by other penalty phase
381. Id. at 539.
382. Id. at 541.
383. Id. at 541-42.
384. See supra notes 356-79 and accompanying text.
385. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424 (rejecting footnote 21 of Witherspoon as dicta).
386. People v. Easley, 46 Cal. 3d 712, 759 P.2d 490, 250 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1988) [hereinafter
Easley II].
387. People v. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d 858, 671 P.2d 813, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1983).
388. Easley II, 46 Cal. 3d at 727, 759 P.2d at 499, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
389. 44 Cal. 3d 480, 749 P.2d 803, 244 Cal. Rptr. 148, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 188 (1988).
390. Id. at 505-06, 749 P.2d at 819, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
391. Id., 244 Cal. Rptr. at 164-65.
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errors.392
B. The 1978 Briggs Initiative: Commutation Instruction
The 1978 Briggs Initiative made two fundamental changes in the
penalty determination procedure mandated by the 1977 death penalty
law. The first change was to require an instruction be given to the jury
that a sentence of life without possibility of parole can be commuted or
modified:
The trier of fact shall be instructed that a sentence of confine-
ment to state prison for a term of life without the possibility of
parole may in the future after sentence is imposed, be com-
muted or modified to a sentence that includes the possibility of
parole by the Governor of the State of California.3 93
Apparently, this instruction was intended to directly repudiate the 1964
ruling of the California Supreme Court in People v. Morse.394
In People v. Ramo, 395 the California Supreme Court held, in a six-
to-one decision authored by Justice Tobriner, that the commutation in-
struction mandated by the Briggs Initiative violated the due process
rights guaranteed by the fifth, eighth and fourteenth amendments of the
United States Constitution by encouraging the jury to consider an irrele-
vant and confusing factor and biasing the outcome in favor of the death
penalty. 39 6 This ruling was reversed by the United States Supreme
Court, which held in a five-to-four decision that the instruction did not
violate the federal constitution.397 On remand, the California Supreme
Court addressed the constitutionality of the instruction under the state
392. Id. at 527, 749 P.2d at 833, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 179 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
393. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988).
394. 60 Cal. 2d 631, 388 P.2d 33, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1964). The Morse court held that the
possibility of parole is essentially irrelevant to the issues the jury is called upon to decide, and
that instructing the jury as to the commutation power of the governor over life sentences is a
"half-truth" because that power extends to sentences of death as well. Id. at 648-53, 388 P.2d
at 43-47, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 211-15. None of the other 38 states with death penalty laws mandate
an instruction regarding the governor's power to commute or modify a sentence, and the
courts of 25 of those states have ruled that the jury should not consider the possibility of
pardon, parole or commutation. In the 15 years since the death penalty was struck down in
Furman v. Georgia, only one state supreme court (Indiana) has approved of an instruction
allowing the jury to consider the possibility of parole or commutation in deciding whether to
impose the death penalty.
395. 30 Cal. 3d 553, 639 P.2d 908, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1982), rev'd 463 U.S. 992 (1983)
[hereinafter Ramos I].
396. Id. at 591-92, 639 P.2d at 936, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
397. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-14 (1983).
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constitution.398 Although intervening decisions in Carlos and Garcia
then required reversal of the special circumstances finding in Ramos II,
the court addressed the penalty phase issue "for guidance both at retrial
and in other cases.",399 Although three of the justices who decided Ra-
mos I had been replaced, the vote was again six to one to strike down the
Briggs instruction, this time as a violation of the due process guarantee of
the California constitution.' ° Ramos II was subsequently interpreted to
require reversal of another death penalty determination in People v.
Montiel. ° The Montiel court suggested a rule of automatic reversal,
since giving the instruction "necessarily subjects the defendant to
prejudice.''
2
Among its final death penalty decisions, rendered on January 2,
1987, the Bird court reversed one more case on the grounds that the
court gave an unadorned Briggs commutation instruction in the penalty
phase." 3 In what many saw as an ominous sign, Justice Lucas and Jus-
tice Panelli noted they were concurring "under compulsion" of Ramos II
and Montiel.40
The Lucas court has continued to reverse the penalty determination
when an "unadorned" Briggs instruction is given. A total of seven death
judgments were unanimously reversed through March 1989.405 How-
ever, the court has limited Ramos II and Montiel in one significant way.
In People v. Hamilton,"6 where the judge gave an ameliorative instruc-
tion limiting the impact of the Briggs instruction, the court concluded
that the error of giving the Briggs instruction was harmless." 7 The ame-
liorative instruction immediately followed the statutory Briggs instruc-
tion with an admonition that the governor's power to commute or
modify a sentence should not be considered in determining whether the
defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without
possibility of parole." 8 Justice Broussard dissented, suggesting that the
398. People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136, 142, 689 P.2d 430, 432, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800, 802
(1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1119 (1985) [hereinafter Ramos II].
399. Id. at 150, 689 P.2d at 437, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 807.
400. Id. at 159, 689 P.2d at 444, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
401. 39 Cal. 3d 910, 928, 705 P.2d 1248, 1258, 218 Cal. Rptr. 572, 583 (1985).
402. Id. at 928, 705 P.2d at 1258, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 582-83.
403. People v. Myers, 43 Cal. 3d 250, 272-73, 729 P.2d 698, 712, 233 Cal. Rptr. 264, 277-78
(1987).
404. Id. at 277, 729 P.2d at 715, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 280 (Lucas, C.J. & Panelli, J.,
concurring).
405. See infra Appendix, Table 3, Table 6.
406. 45 Cal. 3d 351, 753 P.2d 1109, 247 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1988).
407. Id. at 372-76, 753 P.2d at 1123-25, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 44-47.
408. Id. at 374, 753 P.2d at 1124, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
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supplementary instruction only heightened rather than ameliorated the
prejudice." 9 Hamilton has since been followed to affirm two additional
death judgments despite the giving of a Briggs instruction. 410 Justice
Broussard has concurred "under compulsion of Hamilton."4"I
C. The 1978 Briggs Initiative: The "Weighing" Instructions
The second fundamental change that the Briggs Initiative made in
the penalty determination procedure established by the 1977 law related
to the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The 1977
law defined the aggravating and mitigating factors that might be rele-
vant, and then provided that the jury "consider, take into account and be
guided by" those factors in making the ultimate determination of the
appropriate penalty. 412 The 1978 Briggs Initiative went a step further,
concluding:
[The trier of fact] shall impose a sentence of death if the trier of
fact concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances. If the trier of fact determines that
the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circum-
stances the trier of fact shall impose a sentence of confinement
in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of
parole.413
While this provision is susceptible to an interpretation that the death
penalty is mandatoty if a mechanical "balancing" weighs aggravating
factors more heavily than mitigating factors, the Bird court rejected such
an interpretation and upheld the statute against constitutional attack in
People v. Brown.4 14 The court noted that "[e]ach juror is free to assign
whatever moral or sympathetic value he deems appropriate to each and
all of the various factors he is permitted to consider," rather than
mechanically counting the factors.4 15 The word "shall," the court con-
cluded, does not require any juror to vote for death unless he considers it
the appropriate penalty under all the circumstances. 416 Nonetheless, the
409. Id. at 381, 753 P.2d at 1128-29, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 49 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
410. See People v. Coleman, 46 Cal. 3d 749, 782, 759 P.2d 1260, 1282, 251 Cal. Rptr. 83,
105 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1578 (1989); People v. McLain, 46 Cal. 3d 97, 118-20, 757
P.2d 569, 581-82, 249 Cal. Rptr. 630, 642-43 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1356 (1989).
411. McLain, 46 Cal. 3d at 122, 757 P.2d at 583, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 645 (Broussard, J.,
concurring).
412. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (repealed 1978).
413. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988).
414. 40 Cal. 3d 512, 709 P.2d 440, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, 479
U.S. 538 (1987) [hereinafter Brown I].
415. Id. at 542, 709 P.2d at 456, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
416. Id.
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court noted the potential for confusion if the statute were simply read to
the jury with no further explanation.417 In future trials, the court ruled,
the scope of their discretion must be explained to juries.4 1 8 In a modifica-
tion of its opinion announced on January 30, 1986, the court indicated
that a recently drafted modification of California Jury Instruction
Number 8.84.2 would conform to the Brown requirements:419 In cases
already tried where no such instruction was given, the court indicated it
would examine, on a case by case basis, whether "the sentencer may have
been misled to defendant's prejudice.
4 20
After Brown, the Bird court reviewed two cases to determine
whether instructions pursuant to the Briggs Initiative misled the sen-
tencer as to the discretion to be exercised. In both cases, a death penalty
verdict was reversed. In People v. Davenport,4 21 the jury was given an
instruction that closely tracked the language of California Penal Code
section 190.3, that a sentence of death shall be imposed if the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.422 The court
found the error was compounded by two other instructional errors: (1)
the jury was not told that other crimes must be proven beyond a reason-
able doubt, as required by People v. Robertson;423 and (2) in delineating
potential aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the court used the lan-
guage of section 190.3(k), that the jury could consider "[a]ny other cir-
cumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is
not a legal excuse for the crime."'42 4 The court had previously noted the
potential for confusion regarding subsection (k) in People v. Easley.a25
Section 190.2(k) could be construed to exclude circumstances that relate
to the general character, family background or other aspects of the de-
fendant unrelated to the crime.426 Since the only mitigation evidence of-
fered by the defendant related to the circumstances of his upbringing, the
court found that the instructional errors were prejudicial.427
In People v. Walker,4 28 the instruction that the jurors shall impose a
,.417. Id. at 544 n.17, 709 P.2d. at 459 n.17, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 656 n.17.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 545 n.18, 709 P.2d at 459 n.18, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 656 n.18.
420. Id. at 544 n.17, 709 P.2d at 459 n.17, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 656 n.17.
421. 41 Cal. 3d 247, 710 P.2d 861, 221 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1985).
422. Id. at 284-85, 710 P.2d at 885, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
423. 33 Cal. 3d 21, 53, 655 P.2d 279, 298, 188 Cal. Rptr. 77, 96 (1982).
424. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d. at 282, 710 P.2d at 883, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
425. 34 Cal. 3d 858, 878, 671 P.2d 813, 826, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 332 (1983).
426. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d at 282-83, 710 P.2d at 883, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
427. Id. at 286-87, 710 P.2d at 886-87, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 819-20.
428. 41 Cal. 3d 116, 711 P.2d 465, 222 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1985). The opinion in the official
reporter was depublished following a grant of a rehearing.
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penalty of death if aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating cir-
cumstances was again compounded by the subsection (k) instruction.429
These errors were fully exploited in the prosecutor's closing argument,
leading the court to conclude that sufficient prejudice was shown to war-
rant reversal.43°
The impact of the "weighing" instruction condemned in Brown is
unquestionably the most divisive issue the Lucas court has struggled with
in death penalty cases. The alignments on this issue are volatile and un-
predictable. For example, three of four reversals on this issue have been
by four-to-three votes, with a different line-up of dissenters in each
case.4 3 1 Only Chief Justice Lucas has dissented in all three.4 32
The main focus in these cases has been the prosecutor's argument.
In People v. Milner,433 the only unanimous reversal, the prosecutor built
the entire penalty argument on the theme that the jury could avoid per-
sonal responsibility for a death decision by "hiding" behind the law.434
In People v. Crandell,4 35 on the other hand, the prosecutor presented lit-
tle argument; however, because the pro se defendant waived argument,
the majority concluded that the argument erroneously focused the jury
on the absence of justification for the crime and falsely implied a lack of
mitigating factors.43 6 Chief Justice Lucas dissented, joined by Justices
Eagleson and Panelli.437 In People v. Farmer,438 the prosecutor told the
jury: "You do not decide life or death. The law does that., 439 Justice
Kaufman and Chief Justice Lucas joined Justice Panelli in dissenting." 0
Finally, in People v. Edelbacher," the majority found the prosecutor's
argument unduly focused on the weighing function without reference to
429. Id., 711 P.2d at 477-78, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 181-82.
430. Id.
431. See People v. Edelbacher, 47 Cal. 3d 983, 766 P.2d 1, 254 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1989);
People v. Farmer, 47 Cal. 3d 888, 765 P.2d 940, 254 Cal. Rptr. 508, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.3158 (1989); People v. Crandell, 46 Cal. 3d 833, 760 P.2d 423, 251 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1578 (1989).
432. See infra notes 435-43 and accompanying text.
433. 45 Cal. 3d 227, 753 P.2d 669, 246 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1988).
434. Id. at 255, 753 P.2d at 687, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
435. 46 Cal. 3d 833, 760 P.2d 423, 251 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1988).
436. Id. at 884-85, 760 P.2d at 452, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
437. Id. at 886, 760 P.2d at 453, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 257 (Lucas, C.J., Eagleson & Panelli, JJ.,
dissenting).
438. 47 Cal. 3d 888, 765 P.2d 941, 254 Cal. Rptr. 508, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3158 (1989).
439. Id. at 928, 765 P.2d at 967, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
440. Id. at 931, 765 P.2d at 969, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 537 (Panelli, J., dissenting in part). This
was one of the truly rare occasions where Chief Justice Lucas and Justice Eagleson have ever
parted company. They disagreed in only 2.9% of the cases decided in 1988-89. Uelmen,
Mainstream Justice, CAL. LAW. 36, 39 (July 1989).
441. 47 Cal. 3d 983, 766 P.2d i, 254 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1989).
[Vol. 23:237
A TALE OF TWO COURTS
the ultimate moral choice based on the propriety of the penalty." Jus-
tice Panelli gave a separate concurring opinion and Justices Arguelles
and Eagleson joined Chief Justice Lucas in a concurring and dissenting
opinion." 3
The Lucas court has found Brown error harmless in three cases. 4 "
All of these cases were decided by five-to-two votes, with Justices Mosk
and Broussard dissenting." Ironically, one of the three cases was
Brown." 6 As previously noted, the reversal in Brown was based on the
"mere sympathy" instruction." 7 The United States Supreme Court re-
versed on that ground and remanded." 8 On remand, the majority con-
cluded that the weighing instruction was harmless in light of the
prosecutor's argument, but reversed the penalty for an unrelated proce-
dural error." 9  In People v. Hendricks,450  the conclusion that
prosecutorial characterization of the jury's role as "finders of fact" did
not render the incorrect weighing instruction reversible drew a very spir-
ited dissent from Justice Mosk.4 5 1 Finally, in People v. Gates,45 the pen-
alty was upheld because the judge used "may" instead of "shall" in
describing the jury's option if aggravating factors outweigh mitigating
factors, even though the trial judge offered a very confusing explanation
for his choice of words.453
Consistent principles are difficult to extract from these cases. The
conclusion that they are largely driven by the horrendous circumstances
of the underlying murder is hard to resist.
442. Id. at 1038-39, 766 P.2d at 35, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 620-21.
443. Id. at 1043, 766 P.2d at 39, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 624 (Panelli, J., concurring). Id. at 1043,
766 P.2d at 39, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 624 (Lucas, C.J., Arguelles & Eagleson JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
444. People v. Brown, 45 Cal. 3d 1247, 756 P.2d 204, 248 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1988) [hereinafter
Brown II]; People v. Hendricks, 44 Cal. 3d 645, 749 P.2d 836, 244 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 247 (1989); People v. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d 1168, 743 P.2d 301, 240 Cal. Rptr.
666 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2005 (1988).
445. Brown II, 45 Cal. 3d at 1264, 756 P.2d at 215, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 828 (Mosk & Brous-
sard, R3., dissenting); Hendricks, 44 Cal. 3d at 656, 749 P.2d at 847, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 193
(Mosk & Broussard, JJ., dissenting); Gates, 43 Cal. 3d at 1214, 743 P.2d at 331, 240 Cal. Rptr.
at 696 (Mosk & Broussard, JJ., dissenting).
446. See supra notes 414-20 and accompanying text.
447. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
448. Id. at 543.
449. 45 Cal. 3d 1247, 1262-64, 756 P.2d 204, 219-21, 248 Cal. Rptr. 817, 826-27 (1988)
(reversed for trial judge's failure to state reasons for denial of automatic motion for reconsider-
ation of sentence).
450. 44 Cal. 3d 635, 749 P.2d 836, 244 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1988).
451. Id. at 656, 749 P.2d at 847, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 193 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
452. 43 Cal. 3d 1168, 743 P.2d 301, 240 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1987).
453. Id. at 1198, 743 P.2d at 314, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
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D. Erroneous Exclusion/Admission of Evidence
As previously noted, the Bird court reversed three death penalty de-
terminations for erroneous admission of evidence under the 1977 law.
454
Although no Briggs Initiative cases were reversed on that ground, the
principles are largely the same under either law.
In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court has mandated
broad admissibility for "good character" evidence offered by the defend-
ant to show mitigation in the penalty phase of a capital case, although
similar evidence of bad character would not be admissible if initially of-
fered by the prosecution. 5 The California Supreme Court has also
ruled on this issue. In People v. Lucero,456 the Lucas court unanimously
reversed a death penalty determination because expert psychiatric testi-
mony that the defendant would not be dangerous to fellow prisoners was
excluded.457 Recognizing that People v. Murtishaw4 58 held that predic-
tions of future dangerousness were inadmissible when offered by the
prosecution,459 the court concluded that United States Supreme Court
precedent required admission of such evidence when offered by the de-
fense. 60 In People v. Robertson,46 however, the court found that a trial
judge's comment that he would treat such evidence as neither aggravat-
ing nor mitigating did not require reversal.462 Justices Mosk and Brous-
sard dissented from the majority's characterization of the error as
harmless because the trial judge characterized the choice between life
and death as a very close one.463
"Harmless error" was also cited by the court in upholding a third
death determination despite the erroneous admission of evidence. 4 4 Tes-
timony that defendant threatened to kill others, gained via jailhouse in-
formants, was admitted.465 Justices Mosk and Broussard again
454. See supra notes 104-24 and accompanying text; see also infra Appendix, Table 5.
455. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982).
456. 44 Cal. 3d 1006, 750 P.2d 1342, 245 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1988).
457. Id. at 1026, 750 P.2d at 1356, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
458. 29 Cal. 3d 733, 631 P.2d 466, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922.
459. Id. at 767-68, 631 P.2d at 486, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 758.
460. Lucero, 44 Cal. 3d at 1026-27, 750 P.2d at 1357, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
461. 48 Cal. 3d 18, 767 P.2d 1109, 255 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1989).
462. Id. at 53-54, 767 P.2d at 1129, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
463. Id. at 64-83, 767 P.2d at 1136-48, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 658-70 (Mosk & Broussard, JJ.,
dissenting).
464. People v. Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d 86, 129, 753 P.2d 37, 64, 246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 272, cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 404 (1988).
465. Id. at 118-19, 753 P.2d at 56-57, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 264-65.
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dissented.466
E. Competency of Counsel
The Bird court reversed a total of three death penalty determina-
tions based on the incompetence of defense counsel. In People v.
Deere,4 67 the defendant pled guilty to first-degree murder charges and
admitted the special circumstance of multiple murder.4 68 At the penalty
phase, counsel cooperated with the defendant's wish that no mitigating
evidence be presented. 469 The court held that the state's interest in an
accurate determination of penalty requires counsel to present mitigating
evidence even over the objection of his client.47 Deere was a plain case
of the defendant's use of the death penalty to commit suicide. The court
concluded that while one might elect to sacrifice his life in atonement for
a crime, he cannot compel the state to use its resources to take his life.4 71
The state has its own strong interest in reducing the risk of mistaken or
inappropriate death judgments.472 Deere error was unanimously found
in two other cases by the Bird court.4 73
The Lucas court has found little problem with incompetence of
counsel in penalty determinations, although this has been perceived as a
widespread problem in death penalty cases.474 The only reversal on this
ground came in People v. Easley.475 In People v. Miranda,476 the court
rejected a claim that failure to present mitigating evidence during the
penalty phase was incompetence of counsel, since counsel offered the tac-
tical reason that cross-examination would prove more damaging.477 Jus-
tices Broussard and Mosk dissented, asserting the lack of investigation
raised a significant issue whether the tactical choice was an informed one,
466. Id. at 144-46, 753 P.2d at 74-75, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 282-84 (Mosk & Broussard, JJ.,
dissenting).
467. 41 Cal. 3d 353, 710 P.2d 925, 222 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1985).
468. Id. at 357, 710 P.2d at 926, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
469. Id. at 361, 710 P.2d at 929, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
470. Id. at 364-67, 710 P.2d at 931-33, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 20-22.
471. Id. at 362, 710 P.2d at 929-30, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
472. Id. at 363, 710 P.2d at 930, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
473. People v. Bloyd, 43 Cal. 3d 333, 729 P.2d 802, 233 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1987); People v.
Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d 505, 714 P.2d 1251, 224 Cal. Rptr. 112 (1986).
474. See, e.g., Goodpaster, The Trialfor Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Pen-
alty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299 (1983).
475. 46 Cal. 3d 712, 759 P.2d 490, 250 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1988).
476. 44 Cal. 3d 57, 744 P.2d 1127, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2026
(1988).
477. Id. at 121, 744 P.2d at 1167, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
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calling for a full hearing on the claim.47 8 In an opinion announced on
June 26, 1989 (after the period analyzed in this Article), the Lucas court
affirmed the death sentence of a man who was allowed to represent him-
self at the penalty phase, and then urged the jury to impose a death sen-
tence.479 The court concluded that even though counsel continued in an
advisory capacity, he had no obligation to present mitigating evidence
after the defendant was allowed to proceed with self-representation. 8
F. Summary of Penalty Cases
Although the Bird court reached the penalty issue with much less
frequency, when it did, the result was predictable. The court reversed
78.3% of the cases it reviewed.481 Many of these reversals were based on
application of per se rules, under which the court declined to engage in
extended determinations of whether an error was prejudicial. 482 The vast
discretion vested in the jury to choose between life and death was per-
ceived as requiring a strong presumption of prejudice.483
In reviewing penalty determinations, the Lucas court has affirmed
78.8% of the cases it reviewed.484 Although substantially lower than its
affirmance rate for guilt and special circumstance determinations, this
rate is still remarkably consistent with the affirmance rate for the inter-
mediate courts of appeal for sentencing errors in ordinary cases. 485 De-
spite the high affirmance rate, review of the penalty determination seems
to engage the justices in a more intensive give-and-take process than re-
view of guilt or special circumstances. The rate of divided opinions is
substantially higher, and the line-up of majority and dissenters is less
predictable.
The frequency of resort to harmless error by the Lucus Court in
affirming penalty determinations is deeply disturbing. Unlike the review
of guilt or special circumstances, which involvefactual findings and con-
clusions, the determination of penalty involves an impenetrable process
478. Id. at 123-27, 744 P.2d at 1169-72, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 637-39 (Broussard & Mosk, JJ.,
dissenting).
479. People v. Bloom, 48 Cal. 3d 1194, 774 P.2d 698, 259 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1989).
480. Id. at 1226-27, 774 P.2d at 718, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
481. See infra Appendix, Table 2.
482. See, e.g., People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247, 710 P.2d 861, 221 Cal. Rptr. 794
(1985).
483. Id. at 291, 710 P.2d at 889-90, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 822-23 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
484. See infra Appendix, Table 3, Table 6.
485. A study by the Judicial Council conducted in 1981-82 showed sentencing errors were
the single greatest cause for reversal in the court of appeal decisions studied, accounting for
23.2% of reversals. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT, ch. 2.
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of collective conscience. We simply do not know why jurors choose
death over life. To conclude that an error in instructions or the admis-
sion of evidence made no difference in the outcome requires rank specu-
lation. That may explain why so little analysis accompanies the court's
conclusion that a penalty-phase error was "harmless." While the harm-
less error doctrine may have a place in reviewing a factual conclusion, it
should have no place in second guessing an exercise of discretion involv-
ing the choice of life or death.
VI. CONCLUSION. AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In reviewing the transformation in the processing of death penalty
appeals wrought by the 1986 electoral purge of the California Supreme
Court, one persistent theme emerges. The Lucas court has assumed the
non-interventionist, non-supervisory, and conflict-avoiding posture of an
intermediate appellate court in reviewing death judgments. The "norms
of affirmance" that have been identified in the processing of routine crim-
inal appeals by intermediate courts of appeal4 86 are given full sway.
One response might be an exhortation to the court to behave more
like a supreme court in reviewing death judgments, to assume a role that
more actively controls the discretion of prosecutors and trial courts in
originating death judgments, sets minimal standards for defense lawyer
competence, and applies a consistent standard of the proportionality of
death as a punishment. Ironically, the Lucas court has eagerly assumed
a supervisory role in the civil cases it has reviewed.487 Close observers of
the court's work can only marvel at the schizophrenic contrast between
how civil cases are approached and decided and how death penalty cases
are approached and decided. In this court, death cases are different-not
different from ordinary criminal cases, but different from civil cases. Ac-
tually, this ironic difference may be inherent in the judicial function at
any level. In his study of decision-making in the court of appeal, Dr.
Davies observed:
While due process concerns are theoretically most salient in the
constitutional protections involved in criminal procedure, the
court's perceptions of the social costs of strictly enforcing due
process norms... are such that supervisory reversals are actu-
ally less likely in criminal than in civil cases .... The irony is
that, given the extralegal characteristics that predominate in
criminal appeals, the higher standards of due process that are
486. See Davies, supra note 3, at 619.
487. See Uelmen, Mainstream Justice, CAL. LAW., July 1989, at 36.
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theoretically applicable in criminal cases are probably less likely
to be enforced by the Court of Appeal than the somewhat lower
procedural standards applicable to civil appeals.
488
Much the same point was made by Chief Justice Roger Traynor: "Ap-
pellate judges, persuaded by the record that the defendant committed
some crime, are often reluctant to open the way to a new trial, given not
only the risk of draining judicial resources but also the risk that a guilty
defendant may go free." '489
It would be irresponsible, however, to exhort the Lucas court to be-
have "more like a supreme court" in reviewing death cases without rec-
ognizing that the situation is not entirely of their making. The crushing
backlog they inherited may be perceived as a direct result of the Bird
court's behaving "too much like a supreme court" in reviewing death
cases. Whether any court can treat death cases "like a supreme court"
may simply be a function of numbers. If we give the supreme court the
twelve death judgments per year they received up until the early 1970s,
they might review those judgments differently than if we continue to give
them forty per year. The reality of death penalty appeals is that they
come to the supreme court the way ordinary criminal appeals come to
the courts of appeal: without invitation.
The time has come to seriously rethink the procedure for automatic
review of all death penalty judgments by the California Supreme Court.
If the supreme court can fulfill this mandate only by functioning like an
intermediate court of appeal, why not have the case go, initially, to the
court of appeal? The review for error in both the underlying conviction
of guilt and the finding of special circumstances can be done at that level
with even greater efficiency and little difference in the results. The inter-
mediate courts of appeal are already processing a substantial number of
cases in which a sentence of life without possibility of parole was im-
posed. These cases also require findings of special circumstances.
490 If
randomly apportioned among the various districts and divisions of the
courts of appeal, a caseload of forty cases per year would require each
court of appeal justice to sit on two such cases per year. The cases they
reverse could go directly back to the trial courts, unless the supreme
court granted a petition for hearing. The cases they affirm would then
proceed to the supreme court for a review of the penalty determination.
The court would also have the discretion to review any or all of the issues
488. Davies, supra note 3, at 609, 631 (emphasis in original).
489. R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 50 (1970).
490. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1988).
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decided by the court of appeal relating to the finding of guilt and special
circumstances.
This change will permit the supreme court to select particular cases
or issues arising in the context of guilt determination and findings of spe-
cial circumstances for review, and approach that review from its normal
policy making perspective. The function of "error correction" will be left
to the courts of appeal. This essential difference was underlined by the
Davies study:
The particularistic quality of the Court of Appeal's decision
making can be readily appreciated by returning to the distinc-
tion between law articulation and error correction. By its na-
ture, law articulation in the supreme court is universalistic and
systematic in its orientation. The goal of such "policy general-
ization" is to develop principles and rules and disseminate them
in published opinions so that a rule will apply to a whole set of
cases in which the same issue might arise. In contrast, the er-
ror correction task in the Court of Appeal is aimed at "particu-
lar case disposition" and seeks to evaluate the overall
substantive justice of the trial court disposition in light of the
facts and equities of the particular case.4 91
By separating review of the guilt and special circumstance findings
from review of the penalty determination, we more clearly identify what
makes death penalty cases different and give that difference the attention
it deserves. Actually, the guilt and special circumstance findings in death
cases are identical in every respect to the life without possibility of parole
cases currently reviewed by the courts of appeal. To the extent the
supreme court should exercise supervisory responsibility over the
processing of death cases, it can continue to do so by exercising its discre-
tionary jurisdiction. In fact, it can do so more effectively than it does
now, by identifying particular cases or particular issues after they have
been exposed and considered by the court of appeal.
Maintaining automatic review for the penalty determination allows
the supreme court to focus its entire attention on the issue of life or
death. Having the supreme court review all such determinations assures
the consistent application of the judgment of proportionality that inheres
in such review. Reversals of the penalty determination at the supreme
court level will result in a remand directly to the trial court for a new
penalty hearing, that can again be directly reviewed by the supreme court
if it results in another death judgment. The time that the supreme court
491. Davies, supra note 3, at 620 (emphasis in original).
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saves in review of guilt and special circumstance determinations will al-
low the court to resume a more active role in reviewing civil and non-
death criminal cases, while its review of death judgments will be focused
more intensively on the elements that make death cases different.
There are downsides, to be sure.492 First, sending death judgments
to eighteen different divisions and districts of the court of appeal may
result in conflict and inconsistency in the outcome of these cases. As
already noted, reversal rates in ordinary criminal cases vary among divi-
sions of the same district.49 3 Secondly, prosecutors may respond to a
break in the logjam by charging many more homicides as death penalty
cases. While forty cases per year seems like a flood today, streamlining
the system to handle those forty cases efficiently may simply invite a pace
of eighty or a hundred cases per year. Third, spreading the burden
among the courts of appeal means spreading the staff resources needed to
handle this burden as well. Perhaps those staff resources are utilized
more efficiently under the unified direction of the supreme court. Fi-
nally, introducing a two-tiered review may lengthen the appeal process
for the cases that are affirmed.
None of these obstacles is insurmountable. The problem of inconsis-
tency among divisions of the court of appeal will require careful utiliza-
tion of the supreme court's discretionary review jurisdiction in a
supervisory manner. The option to grant review can be selectively uti-
lized to limit review to particular issues. The automatic review of the
death penalty determination in every case will assure that every judg-
ment is scrutinized by every justice of the supreme court. The court will
be free to expand the scope of its review to guilt or special circumstance
findings at any point in the course of the penalty review. Since the jury is
routinely instructed that all evidence admitted during the guilt/special
circumstance phase may be considered in making the penalty determina-
tion, the court will ordinarily review the evidence even in a penalty re-
view. The review of guilt/special circumstance evidence will be greatly
expedited by a prior review in the court of appeal. Even if a prior peti-
tion for discretionary guilt or special circumstance review has been de-
nied, the supreme court should have the option to broaden its review to
include guilt or special circumstance issues.
The potential explosion of death judgments is an issue that should
be dealt with head-on, rather than indirectly by judicial logjams. Those
who support the status quo logjam as a means of discouraging even more
492. See generally Weisberg, Redistributing the Wealth of Capital Cases: Changing Death
Penalty Appeals in California, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 243 (1988).
493. Kanner & Uelmen, supra note 59, at 14-15.
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death judgments avoid coming to grips with the real problem: the dis-
parity in filing standards that is inevitable when fifty-eight different
elected prosecutors are each given ultimate authority to choose whether
to pursue a death penalty. A direct remedy has been proposed, and
should be seriously considered: giving the Attorney General statewide
control over the filing of cases as death penalty cases.4 94
The spreading of staff resources may be a very healthy dispersal,
since staff are influenced by the same institutional norms that influence
the justices.495 Keeping complete review of every aspect of death judg-
ments in the supreme court will mean more and more delegation by the
justices to a central staff of "death penalty professionals." Having a
widely dispersed staff reviewing two cases per year may be preferable to a
large permanent staff doing nothing but one death case after another.
Finally, introducing two tiers to the review process will not increase
delay significantly for the vast majority of cases. The longest period of
delay is in certifying the record.496 Once a case has been processed
through the court of appeal, it will be ready for immediate supreme court
review. The supreme court's task will be made much easier by the prior
analysis of the case in the court of appeal. Most important, dispersing
the cases among the courts of appeal means much more expeditious re-
view, and could even eliminate the current backlog.497 Habeas corpus
petitions would also be heard by the court of appeal. The only cases that
might be delayed longer will be the cases in which the supreme court
exercises its discretion to review the guilt or special circumstance
determination.
In A Tale of Two Cities, Charles Dickens exposes the sharp contrasts
of a revolution-the Declaration of the Rights of Man followed by the
Reign of Terror. A comparison of the death penalty cases processed by
the Bird court with those processed by the Lucas court should serve to
remind us that we have lived through a revolution of sorts. While the
electorate sent a loud and clear message, and the supreme court has re-
sponded to that message, the costs of that response are just becoming
apparent. Death penalty cases usurp the docket of the supreme court,
reducing the justices to performing like a badly overworked intermediate
appellate court, unable to give other issues the attention they deserve.
494. See Peterson, Death Penalty Appeals in California, Postscripts, 28 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 243, 266-70 (1988).
495. Davies, supra note 3, at 634-35.
496. Weisberg, supra note 492, at 246-48.
497. There would be no constitutional impediment to applying the change retroactively and
reassigning currently pending cases to the courts of appeal. See id. at 249 n.20.
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The time has come to take on the task of careful, systemic reform that
deals directly with the underlying problem. A two-tiered system of re-
view, in which the courts of appeal review guilt and special circumstance
findings, while the supreme court reviews penalty determinations, will
permit the justices of the supreme court to get back to being a full-time
supreme court again. It is a far, far better solution that I propose, than I
have ever proposed.4 98
498. Cf. Uelmen, First Year Report: Lucas Court, CAL. LAW., June 1988, at 98.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
STATE SUPREME COURT AFFIRMANCE RATES IN CAPITAL
CASES
1977-1988
% Aff'd State Number of Cases
0.0 Colorado 3
0.0 New Jersey 10
7.8 California 64
(Bird Court, 1970-86)
33.3 Oregon 3
33.3 Wyoming 9
33.3 Washington 12
42.3 N. Carolina 78
43.8 Maryland 32
46.3 S. Carolina 82
47.9 Mississippi 96
50.0 ,Kentucky 30
52.8 Arizona 125
52.8 Alabama 108
53.7 Florida 443
54.8 Oklahoma 84
58.3 Montana 12
58.8 Idaho 17
60.0 Illinois 105
61.8 Arkansas 55
62.5 Delaware 8
62.5 Pennsylvania 64
63.2 Louisiana 87
65.9 Nevada 44
67.1 Texas 319
68.4 Indiana 38
69.1 Tennessee 68
71.8 California 71
(Lucas Court, 1987-89)
73.1 Georgia 245
73.7 Nebraska 19
74.5 Ohio 55
75.0 Utah 12
80.0 New Mexico 5
90.2 Missouri 61
90.6 Virginia 53
National Average: 59.2% Affirmed (2579 cases)
Sources: NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Capital Punishment Project
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TABLE 2
BIRD COURT
SUMMARY OF OUTCOME OF CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
REVIEWING DEATH PENALTY JUDGMENTS
1979-1986
1977 Death
Penalty Law
1978 Briggs
Initiative
Conviction of
Guilt
AFF. REV.
16 11
26 11
Finding of
Special Cir-
cumstances
AFF. REV.
12 4
10 17
42 22 22 21
Determina-
tion of Pen-
alty
AFF. REV.
3 9
2 9
5 18
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TABLE 3
LUCAS COURT
SUMMARY OF OUTCOME OF CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
REVIEWING DEATH PENALTY JUDGMENTS
MARCH 1987-MARCH 1989
1977 Death
Penalty Law
1978 Briggs
Initiative
Conviction of
Guilt
AFF. REV.
10 1
57 3
Finding of
Special Cir-
cumstances
AFF. REV.
9 1
57 0
67 4 66 1
Determina-
tion of Pen-
ally
AFF. REV.
8 1
43 14
51 15
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TABLE 4
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT DISPOSITION
OF DEATH JUDGMENTS
1978-1989
Supreme Court
Dispositionst
0
2
6
3
7
5
10
23
10
7
49
15
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"Backlog"
7
25
43
80
112
144
163
158
174
196
183
175
* Through March, 1989
t Includes cases reviewed on habeas corpus
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989*
New Death
Judgments
7
20
24
40
39
37
29
18
26
29
36
7
A TALE OF TWO COURTS
TABLE 5
DEATH PENALTY CASES REVIEWED BY THE BIRD COURT
Special
Guilt Circumstances Penalty Law
People v. Bloyd,
43 Cal. 3d 333, 729 P.2d 802, 233 Cal.
Rptr. 368 (1987)
People v. Meyers,
43 Cal. 3d 250, 729 P.2d 698, 233 Cal.
Rptr. 264 (1987)
People v. Ledesma,
43 Cal. 3d 171, 729 P.2d 839, 233 Cal.
Rptr. 404 (1987)
People v. Allen,
42 Cal. 3d 1222, 729 P.2d 115, 232 Cal.
Rptr. 849 (1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
202 (1987)
People v. Louis,
42 Cal. 3d 969, 728 P.2d 180, 232 Cal.
Rptr. 110 (1986)
People v. Rodriguez,
42 Cal. 3d 730, 726 P.2d 113, 230 Cal.
Rptr. 667 (1986)
People v. Turner,
42 Cal. 3d 711, 726 P.2d 102, 230 Cal.
Rptr. 656 (1986)
People v. Smallwood,
42 Cal. 3d 415, 722 P.2d 197, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 913 (1986)
People v. Ratliff,
41 Cal. 3d 675, 715 P.2d 665, 224 Cal.
Rptr. 705 (1986)
People v. Burgener,
41 Cal. 3d 505, 714 P.2d 1251, 224 Cal.
Rptr. 112 (1986)
People v. Hamilton,
41 Cal. 3d 408, 710 P.2d 981, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 902 (1985), vacated sub nom.
California v. Hamilton, 478 U.S. 1017
(1986)
People v. Deere,
41 Cal. 3d 353, 710 P.2d 925, 222 Cal.
Rptr. 13 (1985)
People v. Silberston,
41 Cal. 3d 296, 709 P.2d 1321, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 152 (1985)
People v. Davenport,
41 Cal. 3d 247, 710 P.2d 861, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 794 (1985)
R
A A
R
R
A R
A A
A R
A A
R 1978
R 1978
- 1978
A 1978
- 1978
A 1978
- 1978
- 1978
- 1978
R 1978
- 1978
R 1978
- 1978
R 1978
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TABLE 5 (Continued)
DEATH PENALTY CASES REVIEWED BY THE BIRD COURT
Special
Guilt Circumstances Penalty Law
People v. Hamilton,
41 Cal. 3d 211, 710 P.2d 937, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 858 (1985), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1176 (1989)
People v. Balderas,
41 Cal. 3d 144, 711 P.2d 480, 222 Cal.
Rptr. 184 (1985)
People v. Walker,
41 Cal. 3d 116, 711 P.2d 465, 222 Cal.
Rptr. 169 (1985)
People v. Leach,
41 Cal. 3d 92, 710 P.2d 893, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 826 (1985)
People v. Phillips,
41 Cal. 3d 29, 711 P.2d 423, 222 Cal.
Rptr. 127 (1985)
People v. Croy,
41 Cal. 3d 1, 710 P.2d 392, 221 Cal. Rptr.
592 (1985)
People v. Fuentes,
40 Cal. 3d 629, 710 P.2d 240, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 440 (1985)
People v. Massie,
40 Cal. 3d 620, 709 P.2d 1309, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 140 (1985)
People v. Brown,
40 Cal. 3d 512, 709 P.2d 440, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 637 (1985), rev'd in part sub nom.
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987)
People v. Guerra,
40 Cal. 3d 377, 708 P.2d 1252, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 374 (1985)
People v. Montiel,
39 Cal. 3d 910, 705 P.2d 1248, 218 Cal.
Rptr. 572 (1985)
People v. Chavez,
39 Cal. 3d 823, 705 P.2d 372, 218 Cal.
Rptr. 49 (1985)
People v. Frierson,
39 Cal. 3d 803, 705 P.2d 396, 218 Cal.
Rptr. 73 (1985)
People v. Hayes,
38 Cal. 3d 780, 699 P.2d 1259, 214 Cal.
Rptr. 652 (1985)
A R
A R
A R
R -
A A
A R
A A
A R
A R
A R
- 1978
- 1978
R 1978
- 1978
R 1977
- 1977
- 1978
- 1978
R 1978
- 1978
R 1978
- 1978
- 1977
- 1978
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TABLE 5 (Continued)
DEATH PENALTY CASES REVIEWED BY THE BIRD COURT
Special
Guilt. Circumstances Penalty Law
People v. Boyd,
38 Cal. 3d 762, 700 P.2d 782, 215 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1985)
People v. Frank,
38 Cal. 3d 711, 700 P.2d 415, 214 Cal.
Rptr. 801 (1985)
People v. Memro,
38 Cal. 3d 658, 700 P.2d 446, 214 Cal.
Rptr. 832 (1985)
People v. Anderson,
38 Cal. 3d 58, 694 P.2d 1149, 210 Cal.
Rptr. 777 (1985)
People v. Bigelow,
37 Cal. 3d 731, 691 P.2d 994, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 328 (1984)
People v. Armendariz,
37 Cal. 3d 573, 693 P.2d 243, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 664 (1984)
People v. Holt,
37 Cal. 3d 436, 690 P.2d 1207, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 547 (1984)
People v. McDonald,
37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 236 (1984)
People v. Turner,
37 Cal. 3d 302, 690 P.2d 669, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 196 (1984)
People v. Mattson,
37 Cal. 3d 85, 688 P.2d 887, 207 Cal.
Rptr. 278 (1984)
People v. Whitt,
36 Cal. 3d 724, 685 P.2d 1161, 205 Cal.
Rptr. 810 (1984)
People v. Alcala,
36 Cal. 3d 604, 685 P.2d 1126, 205 Cal.
Rptr. 775 (1984)
People v. Lanphear,
36 Cal. 3d 163, 680 P.2d 1081, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 122 (1984)
People v. Harris,
36 Cal. 3d 36, 679 P.2d 433, 201 Cal.
Rptr. 782, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984)
People v. Fields,
35 Cal. 3d. 329, 673 P.2d 680, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 803 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892
(1984)
A R
R -
A R
R R
A R
R
R
A R
R
A A
- 1978
R 1977
- 1977
- 1978
- 1978
- 1978
- 1978
- 1978
- 1978
- 1977
- 1978
- 1978
R 1977
-- 1977
A 1977
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TABLE 5 (Continued)
DEATH PENALTY CASES REVIEWED BY THE BIRD COURT
Special
Guilt Circumstances Penalty Law
People v. Mroczko,
35 Cal. 3d 86, 672 P.2d 835, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 52 (1983)
People v. Joseph,
34 Cal. 3d 936, 671 P.2d 843, 196 Cal.
Rptr. 339 (1983)
People v. Mozingo,
34 Cal. 3d 926, 671 P.2d 363, 196 Cal.
Rptr. 212 (1983)
People v. Easley,
34 Cal. 3d 858, 671 P.2d 813, 196 Cal.
Rptr. 309 (1983)
People v. Robertson,
33 Cal. 3d 21, 655 P.2d 279, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 77 (1982)
People v. Gzikowski,
32 Cal. 3d 580, 651 P.2d 1145, 186 Cal.
Rptr. 339 (1982)
People v. Arcega,
32 Cal. 3d 504, 651 P.2d 338, 186 Cal.
Rptr. 94 (1982)
People v. Stankewitz,
32 Cal. 3d 80, 648 P.2d 578, 184 Cal.
Rptr. 611 (1982)
People v. Hogan,
31 Cal. 3d 815, 647 P.2d 93, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 817 (1982)
People v. Haskett,
30 Cal. 3d 841, 640 P.2d 776, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 640 (1982)
People v. Ramos,
30 Cal. 3d 553, 639 P.2d 908, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 266 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1119 (1985)
People v. Murtishaw,
29 Cal. 3d 733, 631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal.
Rptr. 738 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922
(1982)
People v. Harris,
28 Cal. 3d 935, 623 P.2d 240, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 679 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1111 (1982)
People v. Chadd,
28 Cal. 3d 739, 621 P.2d 837, 170 Cal.
Rptr. 798, cert. denied, 452 U.S. 931 (1981)
R
R
R
A A
A A
R
R
R
R
A R
A A
A A
R
- 1977
- 1978
- 1978
R 1977
R 1977
- 1977
- 1977
- 1977
- 1977
R 1977
R 1978
R 1977
A 1977
- 1977
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TABLE 5 (Continued)
DEATH PENALTY CASES REVIEWED BY THE BIRD COURT
Special
Guilt Circumstances Penalty Law
People v. Jackson, A A A 1977
28 Cal. 3d 264, 618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 603 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1035 (1981)
People v. Thompson, A R - 1977
27 Cal. 3d 303, 611 P.2d 883, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 289 (1980)
People v. Green, A R - 1977
27 Cal. 3d 1, 609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1980)
People v. Lanphear, . A A R 1977
26 Cal. 3d 814, 608 P.2d 689, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 601, vacated sub nom. California v.
Lanphear, 449 U.S. 810 (1980)
People v. Velazquez, A A R 1977
26 Cal. 3d 425, 606 P.2d 341, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 306, vacated sub nom. California v.
Velazquez, 448 U.S. 903 (1980)
People v. Frierson, R - - 1977
25 Cal. 3d 142, 599 P.2d 587, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 281 (1979)
People v. Teron, A R - 1977
23 Cal. 3d 103, 588 P.2d 773, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 633 (1979)
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TABLE 6
DEATH PENALTY CASES REVIEWED BY THE LUCAS COURT
Special
Guilt Circumstances Penalty Law
People v. Boyer,
48 Cal. 3d 247, 768 P.2d 610, 256 Cal.
Rptr. 96 (1989)
People v. Coleman,
48 Cal. 3d 112, 768 P.2d 32, 255 Cal.
Rptr. 813 (1989)
People v. Robertson,
48 Cal. 3d 18, 767 P.2d 1109, 255 Cal.
Rptr. 631 (1989)
People v. Johnson,
47 Cal. 3d 1194, 767 P.2d 1047, 255 Cal.
Rptr. 569 (1989)
People v. Harris,
47 Cal. 3d 1047, 767 P.2d 619, 255 Cal.
Rptr. 352 (1989)
People v. Edelbacher,
47 Cal. 3d 983, 766 P.2d 1, 254 Cal. Rptr.
586 (1989)
People v. Farmer,
47 Cal. 3d 888, 765 P.2d 940, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 508, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3158
(1989)
People v. Bonin,
47 Cal. 3d 808, 765 P.2d 460, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 298 (1989)
People v. Garrison,
47 Cal. 3d 746, 765 P.2d 419, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 257 (1988)
People v. Walker,
47 Cal. 3d 605, 765 P.2d 70, 253 Cal.
Rptr. 863 (1988)
People v. Johnson,
47 Cal. 3d 576, 764 P.2d 1087, 253 Cal.
Rptr. 710 (1988)
People v. Hernandez,
47 Cal. 3d 315, 763 P.2d 1289, 253 Cal.
Rptr. 199 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3201 (1989)
People v. Adcox,
47 Cal. 3d 207, 763 P.2d 906, 253 Cal.
Rptr. 55 (1988)
People v. Moore,
47 Cal. 3d 63, 762 P.2d 1218, 252 Cal.
Rptr. 494 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
2442 (1989)
A A
A A
A A
A A
A A
- 1978
A 1978
A 1977
A 1978
R 1978
R 1978
R 1978
A 1978
R 1978
A 1978
R 1978
A 1978
A 1978
A 1977
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TABLE 6 (Continued)
DEATH PENALTY CASES REVIEWED BY THE LUCAS COURT
Special
Guilt Circumstances Penalty Law
People v. Malone,
47 Cal. 3d 1, 762 P.2d 1249, 252 Cal.
Rptr. 525 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
2442 (1989)
People v. Caro,
46 Cal. 3d 1035, 761 P.2d 680, 251 Cal.
Rptr. 757 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1944 (1989)
People v. Griffin,
46 Cal. 3d 1011, 761 P.2d 103, 251 Cal.
Rptr. 643 (1988)
People v. Jennings,
46 Cal. 3d 963, 760 P.2d 475, 251 Cal.
Rptr. 278 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1559 (1989)
People v. Bean,
46 Cal. 3d 919, 760 P.2d 996, 251 Cal.
Rptr. 467 (1988)
People v. Crandell,
46 Cal. 3d 833, 760 P.2d 423, 251 Cal.
Rptr. 227 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1936 (1989)
People v. Coleman,
46 Cal. 3d 749, 759 P.2d 1260, 251 Cal.
Rptr. 83 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1578 (1989)
People v. Easley,
46 Cal. 3d 712, 759 P.2d 490, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 855 (1988)
People v. Bonin,
46 Cal. 3d 659, 758 P.2d 1217, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 687 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1561 (1989)
People v. Karis,
46 Cal. 3d 612, 758 P.2d 1189, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 659 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1658 (1989)
People v. McDowell,
46 Cal. 3d 551, 758 P.2d 1060, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 530 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1972 (1989)
People v. Keenan,
46 Cal. 3d 478, 758 P.2d 1081, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 550 (1988)
A A
A A
A A
A A
A A
A 1978
A 1978
R 1978
A 1978
A 1978
R 1978
A 1978
R 1977
A 1978
A 1978
A 1978
A 1978
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TABLE 6 (Continued)
DEATH PENALTY CASES REVIEWED BY THE LUCAS COURT
Special
Guilt Circumstances Penalty Law
People v. Brown,
46 Cal. 3d 432, 758 P.2d 1135, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 604 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1329 (1989)
People v. Boyde,
46 Cal. 3d 212, 758 P.2d 25, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 83 (1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct.
2447 (1989)
People v. Hamilton,
46 Cal. 3d 123, 756 P.2d 1348, 249 Cal.
Rptr. 320 (1988)
People v. McLain,
46 Cal. 3d 97, 757 P.2d 569, 249 Cal.
Rptr. 630 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1356 (1989)
People v. Morris,
46 Cal. 3d 1, 756 P.2d 843, 249 Cal. Rptr.
119 (1988)
People v. Marks,
45 Cal. 3d 1335, 756 P.2d 260, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 874 (1988)
People v. Williams,
45 Cal. 3d 1268, 756 P.2d 221, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 834 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
883 (1989)
People v. Brown,
45 Cal. 3d 1247, 756 P.2d 204, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 817 (1988)
People v. Bunyard,
45 Cal. 3d 1189, 756 P.2d 795, 249 Cal.
Rptr. 71 (1988)
People v. Rich,
45 Cal. 3d 1036, 755 P.2d 960, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 510 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
884 (1989)
People v. Ainsworth,
45 Cal. 3d 984, 755 P.2d 1017, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 568 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
883 (1989)
People v. Guzman,
45 Cal. 3d 915, 755 P.2d 917, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 467 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
882 (1989)
A A
A A
A 1978
A 1978
A 1978
A 1978
- 1977
- 1978
A A
A 1978
R 1978
R 1978
A 1977
A 1977
A 1978
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TABLE 6 (Continued)
DEATH PENALTY CASES REVIEWED BY THE LUCAS COURT
Special
Guilt Circumstances Penalty Law
People v. Grant,
45 Cal. 3d 829, 755 P.2d 894, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 444 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
883 (1989)
People v. Robbins,
45 Cal. 3d 867, 755 P.2d 355, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 172 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
849 (1989)
People v. Belmontes,
45 Cal. 3d 744, 755 P.2d 310, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 126 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
848 (1989) -
People v. Babbit,
45 Cal. 3d 660, 755 P.2d 253, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 69 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
849 (1989)
People v. Siripongs,
45 Cal. 3d 548, 754 P.2d 1306, 247 Cal.
Rptr. 729 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
820 (1989)
People v. Silva,
45 Cal. 3d 604, 754 P.2d 1070, 247 Cal.
Rptr. 573 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
820 (1989)
People v. Warren,
45 Cal. 3d 471, 754 P.2d 218, 247 Cal.
Rptr. 172 (1988)
People v. Odle,
45 Cal. 3d 386, 754 P.2d 184, 247 Cal.
Rptr. 137, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 275
(1988)
People v. Hamilton,
45 Cal. 3d 351, 753 P.2d 1109, 247 Cal.
Rptr. 31 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
879 (1989)
People v. Poggi,
45 Cal. 3d 306, 753 P.2d 1082, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 886 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3261 (1989)
People v. Lucky,
45 Cal. 3d 259, 753 P.2d 1052, 247 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 848
(1989)
People v. Milner,
45 Cal. 3d 227, 753 P.2d 669, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 713 (1988)
A A
A A
A A
A A
A A
A A
A A
A A
A A
A A
A A
A A
A 1978
A 1978
A 1978
A 1978
A 1978
A 1978
R 1978
A 1978
A 1978
A 1978
A 1978
R 1978
November 1989]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
TABLE 6 (Continued)
DEATH PENALTY CASES REVIEWED BY THE LUCAS COURT
Special
Guilt Circumstances Penalty Law
People v. Heishman,
45 Cal. 3d 147, 753 P.2d 629, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 673, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 380
(1988)
People v. Thompson,
45 Cal. 3d 86, 753 P.2d 37, 246 Cal. Rptr.
245, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 404 (1988)
People v. Dyer,
45 Cal. 3d 26, 753 P.2d 1, 246 Cal. Rptr.
209, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 330 (1988)
People v. Williams,
44 Cal. 3d 1127, 751 P.2d 901, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 635, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 514
(1988)
People v. Lucero,
44 Cal. 3d 1006, 750 P.2d 1342, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 185 (1988)
People v. Wade,
44 Cal. 3d 975, 750 P.2d 794, 244 Cal.
Rptr. 905 (1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
248 (1988)
People v. Williams,
44 Cal. 3d 883, 751 P.2d 395, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 336, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 249
(1988)
People v. Melton,
44 Cal. 3d 713, 750 P.2d 741, 244 Cal.
Rptr. 867, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 329
(1988)
People v. Hendricks,
44 Cal. 3d 635, 749 P.2d 836, 244 Cal.
Rptr. 181, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 247
(1988)
People v. Ruiz,
44 Cal. 3d 589, 749 P.2d 854, 244 Cal.
Rptr. 200, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 186
(1988)
People v. Hovey,
44 Cal. 3d 543, 749 P.2d 776, 244 Cal.
Rptr. 121, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 188
(1988)
People v. Hale,
44 Cal. 3d 531, 749 P.2d 769, 244 Cal.
Rptr. 114 (1988)
A A
A A
A A
A A
A 1978
A 1978
A 1978
A 1978
R 1978
A 1978
A 1978
A 1978
A 1978
A 1978
A 1977
- 1978
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TABLE 6 (Continued)
DEATH PENALTY CASES REVIEWED BY THE LUCAS COURT
Special
Guilt Circumstances Penalty Law
People v. Kimble,
44 Cal. 3d 480, 749 P.2d 803, 244 Cal.
Rptr. 148, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 188
(1988)
People v. Howard,
44 Cal. 3d 375, 749 P.2d 279, 243 Cal.
Rptr. 842, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 188
(1988)
People v. Snow,
44 Cal. 3d 216, 746 P.2d 452, 242 Cal.
Rptr. 477 (1987)
People v. Bell,
44 Cal. 3d 137, 745 P.2d 573, 241 Cal.
Rptr. 890 (1987)
People v. Miranda,
44 Cal. 3d 57, 744 P.2d 1127, 241 Cal.
Rptr. 594 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
2026 (1988)
People v. Gates,
43 Cal. 3d 1168, 743 P.2d 301, 240 Cal.
Rptr. 666 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
2005 (1988)
People v. Anderson,
43 Cal. 3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal.
Rptr. 585 (1987)
People v. Ghent,
43 Cal. 3d 739, 739 P.2d 1250, 239 Cal.
Rptr. 82 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1099 (1988)
People v. Hendricks,
43 Cal. 3d 584, 737 P.2d 1350, 238 Cal.
Rptr. 66 (1987)
A A
R -
A A
A A
A A
A A
A 1977
A 1978
- 1977
A 1977
A 1978
A 1978
R 1978
A 1977
R 1978
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